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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to the provisions of UCA 
§78-2a-3(2)(j). 
rv 
ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court err as a matter of law in granting Superior's motion for 
summary judgment. (Record at 36-55). 
Standard of Review: In considering an appeal of the grant or denial of a summary 
judgment, appellate courts review the facts and all reasonable inferences from them in a 
light most favorable to the losing party. The legal conclusions reached by the trial court in 
grantmg summary judgment are accorded no deference but, instead, are reviewed for 
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correctness. Holt v. Katsanevas, 854 p.2d 575 (Ut. App. 1993), citing Larson v. 
Overland Thrift & Loan, 818 P.2d 1316, 1319 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied, 832 P.2d 
476 (Utah 1992) and Pratt v. Mitchell Hollow Irrigation Co., 813 P.2d 1169, 1171 (Utah 
1991). 
2. Did the trial court err as a matter of law in weighing the evidence jn mis case? 
(Record at 97-101). 
Standard of Review In considering an appeal of the grant or denial of a summary 
judgment, appellate courts review the facts and all reasonable inferences from them in a 
light most favorable to the losing party. The legal conclusions reached by the trial court in 
granting summary judgment are accorded no deference but, instead, are reviewed for 
correctness. Holt v. Katsanevas, 854 p.2d 575 (Ut. App. 1993), citing Larson v. 
Overland Thrift & Loan, 818 P.2d 1316, 1319 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied, 832 P.2d 
476 (Utah 1992) and Pratt V. Mitchell Hollow Irrigation Co., 813 P.2d 1169, 1171 (Utah 
1991). 
3. Did the trial court err as a matter of law in viewing the evidence in this 
case in a light most favorable to Superior? (Record at 97-101). 
Standard of Review: In considering an appeal of the grant or denial of a summary 
judgment, appellate courts review the facts and all reasonable inferences from them in a 
light most favorable to the losing party. The legal conclusions reached by the trial court in 
granting summary judgment are accorded no deference but, instead, are reviewed for 
correctness. Holt v. Katsanevas, 854 p.2d 575 (Ut. App. 1993), citing Larson v. 
Overland Thrift & Loan, 818 P.2d 1316, 1319 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied, 832 P.2d 
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476 (Utah 1992) and Pratt v. Mitchell Hollow Irrigation Co., 813 P.2d 1169, 1171 (Utah 
1991). 
4. Did the trial court err as a matter of law in denying Mr. Pett's Motion to 
Strike the affidavit of Wendy Gittins? (Record at 75-83). 
Standard of Review: In reviewing a motion to strike an affidavit, appellate courts 
apply a correction-of-error standard. Bonneville Billing v. Whatley, 949 P.2d 768 (Ut. 
App. 1997), citing State Dep't ofSoc. Servs. v. Vijil, 784 P.2d 1130, 1132 (Utah 1989) 
and Workman v. Nagle Constr., Inc., 802 P.2d 749, 754 a 11 (Ut. App. 1990) 
5. Did the trial court err in awarding Superior attorney's fees and interest at 
the rate of 18% on the amount in claimed Mr. Pett owned in its complaint? (Record 
at 97-101). 
Standard of Review: In considering an appeal of the grant or denial of a summary 
judgment, appellate courts review the facts and all reasonable inferences from them in a 
light most favorable to the losing party. The legal conclusions reached by the trial court in 
granting summary judgment are accorded no deference but, instead, are reviewed for 
correctness. Holt v. Katsanevas, 854 p.2d 575 (Ut. App. 1993), citing Larson v. 
Overland Thrift & Loan, 818 P.2d 1316, 1319 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied, 832 P.2d 




DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES. ORDINANCES. 
RULES AND REGULATIONS 
RULES: 
Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or 
to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the 
commencement of the action or after service of a motion for summary judgment by the 
adverse party, move for summary judgment upon all or any part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is 
asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, move for summary 
judgment as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall be in 
accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, 
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there 
is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule judgment is not 
rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court 
at the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it and 
by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist without 
substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith 
controverted. It shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without 
substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other 
relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action as are 
just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed established, and 
the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing 
affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be 
admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to 
testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof 
referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may 
permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
-viii-
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere 
allegations or denials of the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise 
provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for 
trial. Summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against a party failing to file 
such a response. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a party 
opposing the motion that the party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts 
essential to justify the party's opposition, the court may refuse the application for 
judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to 
be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. If any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are 
presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order 
the party presenting them to pay to the other party the amount of the reasonable expenses 
which the filing of the affidavits caused, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any 
offending party or attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
-ix-
VI 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal of the trial court's December 20, 2006 "Findings, Order, and 
Judgment" granting Superior's motion for summary judgment, as modified by the trial 
court's memorandum decision dated December 28, 2006, and the trial court's denial of 
Mr. Pett's Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Wendy Gittins also dated December 28, 
2006. 
B 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION IN THE TRIAL COURT 
Superior filed a complaint against Mr. Pett on February 1, 2006, claiming that he 
owed a sum of money to it for services allegedly provided to Mr. Pett or on behalf of Mr. 
Pett's family. 
Mr. Pett answered the complaint on February 17, 2006, denying Superior's 
allegations contained in its complaint and asserted various affirmative defenses. 
The trial court sent a notice of intent to dismiss for failure to prosecute on July 21, 
2006. 
On July 31, 2006, Superior filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings or in the 
alternative for summary judgment(hereinafter, "Superior's motion"). In conjunction with 
its motion, Superior filed a memorandum and an affidavit from Wendy Gittins. 
Mr. Pett filed a memorandum in opposition to Superior's motion on August 18, 
2006, and supported the memorandum with his own Affidavit. 
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Superior filed a reply memorandum on August 28, 2006. 
Mr. Pett filed a Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Gittins (hereinafter, "Mr. Pett's 
Motion") on September 5, 2006, and supported it with a memorandum. 
Superior filed a memorandum in opposition to Mr. Pett's Motion on September 13, 
2006. 
On December 1, 2006, the trial court entered a memorandum decision granting 
Superior's motion. 
On or about September 5, 2006, Mr. Pett's counsel received the trial courts 
memorandum decision granting Superior's motion for summary judgment. Therefore, 
Mr. Pett's counsel did not file Mr. Pett's reply memorandum in support his Motion or 
submit the motion for decision. 
On December 20, 2006, Pett filed an objection to Superior's proposed order on its 
motion. 
On December 20, 2006, the trial court entered a document entitled Findings, Order 
And Judgment, in which it stated: "The Court finds that the defenses raised in the 
Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition appear to be disingenuous. " 
On December 28, 2006, the trial court entered a second memorandum decision on 
Mr. Pett's Objection to Superior's proposed order and judgment in its motion for 
summary judgment and denying Mr. Pett's Motion, where in it again launched into an 
examination of the facts, weighed the facts and again viewed the evidence in a light most 
favorable to Superior. At the end of the memorandum decision the trial court stated: 
This memorandum decision will serve as notice that the Findings, Order and 
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Judgment submitted by the Plaintiff have been modified on the first line under 
findings to provide that: 
"The Court finds the defenses raised in the Defendant's Memorandum in 
Opposition appear to be without merit. " (Record at 101-104). 
On December 29, the trial court entered an order denying Mr. Pett's Motion. 
On January 29, 2007, Mr. Pett filed his Notice of Appeal. 
C 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The plaintiff filed its complaint on February 1, 2006 asserting that it was the 
assignee of Interwest Anesthesia and that Mr. Pett owed a sum of money to Interwest. 
(Record at 3-6), 
2. Mr. Pett filed an answer disputing the plaintiffs assertion that he owed 
Interwest Anesthesia or the plaintiff any amount of money. (Record at 10-17). 
3. On or about July 31, 2006, the plaintiff filed a "motion for judgment on the 
pleadings or in the alternative, for summary judgment." (Record at 21-22). 
4. On August 17, 2006, Mr. Pett filed a Memorandum in Opposition to the 
plaintiffs "motion for judgment on the pleadings or in the alternative, for summary 
judgment," accompanied by an affidavit disputing the assertions contained in plaintiffs 
"motion for judgment on the pleadings or in the alternative, for summary judgment." 
(Record at 36-51). 
5. The plaintiff filed a reply memorandum in support of its "motion for judgment 
on the pleadings or in the alternative, for summary judgment." on August 28, 2006. 
(Record at 57-66). 
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6. The plaintiff filed a notice to submit on August 30, 2006. (Record at 70-72). 
7. The trial court entered its memorandum decision granting the plaintiff's 
"motion for judgment on the pleadings or in the alternative, for summary judgment" on 
December 1, 2006, stating "The Court finds that the defenses raised in the Defendant's 
Memorandum in Opposition appear to be disingenuous, " (Record at 77-83). 
8. The plaintiff prepared "findings^ order and judgment" and served a copy of the 
"findings, and Judgment" on Mr. Pett's counsel on or about December 12, 2006. (Record 
at 97-100). 
9. Mr. Pett filed an objection to plaintiffs "findings, order and judgment" on 
December 20, 2006. (Record at 101-107). 
10. Even though Mr. Pett filed an objection to plaintiff's "findings, order and 
judgmenf' within the time specified in Rule 7(e) and 7(f)(2) URCP, the trial court 
nonetheless signed plaintiffs "findings, order and judgment" on December 20, 2006 
without considering or addressing Mr. Pett's Objection to plaintiffs "findings, order and 
judgment." (Record at 94-95). 
11. Mr. Pett filed a Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Wendy Gittins on September 
5, 2006, However, because he received the court's memorandum decision granting 
plaintiff s "motion for judgment on the pleadings or in the alternative, for summary 
judgment." the same day he mailed his Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Wendy Gittins, 
he never bothered to submit the Motion for decision. (Record at 75-83). 
12. On December 28, 2006, the trial court issued a memorandum decision denying 
Mr. Pett's Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Wendy Gittins. The trial court also stated 
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that Mr. Pett was correct in its assertion that it was improper for the court to make 
findings. Then, the trial court launched into a gratuitous examination and weighing of the 
disputed facts of that case and proceeded to examine the disputed facts, make factual 
findings concerning the disputed facts and viewing the disputed facts in a light most 
favorable to the plaintiff. After making its gratuitous examination and weighing of the 
disputed facts, viewing the disputed facts in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, and 
making factual findings concerning the disputed facts the trial court made the following 
nonsensical statement: 
This memorandum decision will serve as notice that the Findings, Order and 
Judgment submitted by the Plaintiff have been modified on the first line under 
findings to provide that: 
"The Court finds the defenses raised in the Defendant fs Memorandum in 
Opposition appear to be without merit. " (Record at 101-106). 
13. Mr. Pett filed his Notice of Appeal on January 29, 2007. (Record at 113). 
vn 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court committed reversible and prejudicial error with it granted 
Superior's motion for summary judgment. The trial court committed reversible and 
prejudicial error when it weighed the evidence on Superior's motion for summary 
judgment. The trial court also committed reversible and prejudicial error when it viewed 
the disputed facts in a light most favorable to Superior on Superior's motion for summary 
judgment. The trial court further erred and committed reversible and prejudicial error 
when it denied Mr. Pett's Motion to Strike the affidavit of Wendy Gittins. The trial court 
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also erred and committed reversible and prejudicial error when it awarded Superior 
attorney's fees and interest at 18% on its motion for summary judgment. 
vm 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE AND PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR WHEN IT GRANTED SUPERIOR'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT. 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE AND PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR WHEN IT GRANTED SUPERIOR'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT. 
A. SUMMARY JUDGMENT MAY ONLY BE ENTERED WHEN THERE ARE NO 
GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT PRESENT IN THE CASE; 
In pertinent part, Rule 56(c) URCP provides: 
The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show 
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. (Emphasis added). 
Additionally, Utah appellate courts have long and consistently held that summary 
judgment can only be granted if there are no genuine issues of material fact and if the 
moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. 
"Summary judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issues of material fact 
exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. "Jones v. 
ERA Brokers Consol, 2000 UT61, ^ 8, 6P.3dll29; see also UtahR. Civ. P. 
56(c). 
Collardv. Nagle Construction, Inc., 57 P.3d 603 (Ut. App. 2002). 
A trial court is not authorized to weigh facts in deciding a summary judgment 
motion, but is only to determine whether a dispute of material fact exists, Draper 
City v. Estate of Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097, 1100 (Utah 1995). Tretheway v. 
Miracle Mortgage, Inc., 2000 UT 12, y 995 P. 2d 599. 
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Pigs Gun Club, Inc. v. Sanpete City., 42 P.3d 379 ( Utah 2001). 
In Hebertson v. Bank One, 342 P.2, 383 (Utah 1999), the Utah Supreme Court, 
quoting Parker v. Dodgion, 971 P.2d 496 (Utah 1998), declared that: "Summary 
judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." See also> Certified Sur. Group, 
Ltd. v. UTInc., supra, citing Taylor v. Ogden Sch. Dist, supra. "In ruling on a motion 
for summary judgment, the court may consider only facts that are not in dispute. " 
Sorensen v. Beers, 585 P.2d 458 (Utah 1978). 
By definition, summary judgment cannot be granted where there are disputed 
facts. Ron Shepherd Ins., Inc. v. Shields, 882 P.2d 650, 654 (Utah 1994) 
("Summary judgment is proper only when no genuine issues of material fact 
remain....n). 
Buzas Baseball, Inc. v. Salt Lake Trappers, Inc\, 925 P.2d 941 (Utah 1996). 
In Christensen ex rel. Christensen v. Financial Serv. Co., 14 Utah 2d 101, 377 
P.2d 110, (1963), the Utah Supreme Court held that summary judgment cannot properly 
be granted if the allegations in the plaintiffs complaint stand in opposition to the 
averments of the affidavits so that there are controverted issues of fact, the determination 
of which is necessary to settle the rights of the parties. In Holbrook Co. V. Adams, 542 
P.2d 191 (Utah 1975), the Utah Supreme Court stated that "It takes only one sworn 
statement to dispute the averments on the other side of controversy and create an issue of 
fact, precluding summary judgment. " 
In Sanberg v. Klein, 576 P.2d 1291 (Utah 1978), the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
Where the parties were not in complete conflict as to certain facts, but the 
understanding, intention, and consequences of those facts were vigorously 
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disputed, the matter was not proper for summary judgment and could only 
be resolved by a trial. 
Because the trial court improperly made improper and unlawful factual findings 
and ignored the standard for summary judgment when it granted Superior's motion for 
summary judgment, this Court must reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment 
in favor of Superior, as a matter of law. 
B. THERE ARE GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT PRESENT IN THIS CASE 
WHICH PRECLUDED THE TRIAL COURT FROM ENTERING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF SUPERIOR. 
Because there are genuine issues of material fact present in this case, the trial court 
erred as a matter of law, and committed reversible and prejudicial error, when it granted 
Superior's motion for summary judgment. 
1. Superior's Own Documents Establish That There Is A Genuine Issue Of Fact 
As To How Much, If Any. Mr. Pett Allegedly Owes Interwest. 
In its complaint, Superior claims that Mr. Pett owes it $1,299.05, with $627.04 
allegedly representing the "Unpaid Principal " (Record at 6). In her affidavit, Gittens 
claims that the principal amount owed to Interwest is $572.00. (Record at 30). However, 
in Exhibit A, attached to the affidavit of Gittins, that Superior filed in support of its 
motion for summary judgment, Interwest claims that only $317.57 was allegedly 
transferred to Superior for collection. (Record at 34). Therefore, there is a genuine issue 
of material fact in Superior's own documents as to how much, if any, Mr. Pett allegedly 
owes to Interwest. 
Because there is a genuine issue of material fact as to how much, if any, Mr. Pett 
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allegedly owes to Interwest, the trial court could not grant Superior's motion for summary 
judgment. Because the trial court granted Superior's motion for summary judgment when 
there is a genuine issue of material fact as to how much, if any, Mr. Pett allegedly owes 
to Interwest, the trial court erred, as a matter of law, and committed prejudicial and 
reversible error, when it granted Superior's motion for summary judgment. Therefore, 
this Court must reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Superior. 
2. Mr. Pett's Affidavit Creates Genuine Issues Of Material Fact That Precluded 
The Trial Court From Granting Superior's Motion For Summary Judgment. 
hi its memorandum in support of its motion for summary judgment Superior states: 
On or about July 12, 2004 the Defendant's insurance company, Altius, sent a 
payment, in the amount of $334.62 to Interwest Anesthesia. (Record at 24, f 9). 
However, Altius retracted that payment on July 31, 2005. because on or about 
February 25. 2006. Altius paid the Defendant $514.80. to pay for the services and 
supplies provided by Interwest Anesthesia to the Defendant's daughter on or about 
May 27, 2004. (Emphasis added). (Record at 24, % 10). 
In his Affidavit, filed in support of his Memorandum in Opposition to Superior's 
Motion for Summary Judgment, Mr. Pett states: 
Gittins' claim, as set forth in paragraph 13 of her affidavit, that on February 25, 
2005, Altius paid me $514.80, is not true. 1 have never received any payment from 
Altius in the fifteen years 1 have been covered by their insurance. (Record at 54, f^ 
9). 
/ have no way of knowing if Altius paid Interwest $334.62 on July 12, 2004, as 
Gittins claims in paragraph 12 of her affidavit, however, I never received $514.80 
from Altius on February 25, 2005. I would remember if out of the blue, anyone 
sent me a check for $514.80, and if Interwest claims it did, where is the check with 
my signature on it? (Record at 54, f 13). 
Because Superior bases its claim that Altius retracted its payment of $334.62 to 
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Interwest, on behalf of Mr. Pett, "because on or about February 25. 2006. Altiuspaid the 
Defendant $514 80. to pay for the services and supplies provided by Interwest Anesthesia 
to the Defendant's daughter on or about May 27, 2004, Mr. Pett's sworn statement, in his 
affidavit, stating that he did not receive any payments from Altius in the entire fifteen 
years he has been insured by Altius, creates a genuine issue of material fact as to whether 
or not the payment of $334.62 to Interwest, on behalf of Mr. Pett, was ever tcretracted. " 
If, as Superior claims, the payment of $334.62 to Interwest, on behalf of Mr. Pett, was 
only "retracted" because Mr. Pett allegedly received a payment of $514.80 on February 
25, 2005, and Mr. Pett swears, under oath, that he never received any payment from 
Altius in the amount of $514.80 on February 25, 2005, or any other amount at any other 
time, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether or not Altius ever "retracted" 
any payment from Interwest, and thus there is a genuine issue of material fact as to what 
amount, if any, Mr. Pett allegedly owes Interwest.1 
Because the trial court granted Superior's motion for summary judgment when 
there is a genuine issue of material fact as to how much, if any, Mr. Pett allegedly owes 
to Interwest, the trial court erred, as a matter of law, and committed prejudicial and 
reversible error when it granted Superior's motion for summary judgment. Therefore, 
this Court must reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Superior. 
1. "It takes only one sworn statement to dispute the averments on the other side of 
controversy and create an issue of fact, precluding summary judgment. " Holbrook Co. 
V. Adams, supra. 
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3. Superior's Assertion That Altius "Retracted" A Payment It Made To Interwest 
On Mr. Pett's Behalf. Some Three Hundred Eighty-Four Days After Altius Made 
That Payment To Interwest Is So Ludicrous That It Alone Creates A Genuine 
Issue Of Material Fact As To Whether Or Not Altius In Fact "Retracted" Any 
Payment It Made To Interwest On Mr. Pett's Behalf And A Genuine Issue Of 
Material Fact As To How Much. If Any. Mr. Pett Owes To Interwest. 
On page 2, \ 9, of Superior's statement of facts, set forth in its memorandum of 
points and authorities in support of its motion, (hereinafter, "Superior's memorandum"), 
Superior claims that it was paid the sum of $334.62 by Altius on July 12, 2004. (Record 
at 24). Then on page 2, If 10, of Superior's statement of facts, set forth in its 
memorandum Superior claims that Mr. Pett's insurance carrier, Altius, uretracted that 
payment on July 31, 2005.... " (Record at 24). However, Superior failed to provide any 
evidence whatsoever indicating that Altius ever retracted any payment it made to 
Interwest on behalf of Mr. Pett at any time, and it is completely absurd to assume that 
Altius could retract a payment it made to Interwest three hundred eighty-four days 
earlier. 
Superior offers no explanation as to how Altius was able to retract a payment it 
made more than a year earlier. Superior does not claim that Altius has access to its bank 
accounts and/or the authority or ability to simply retract payments from Interwest's bank 
accounts on its own, without any authority from Interwest.2 Therefore there is a genuine 
2. In response to Mr. Pett's assertion that Altius did not, and could not, take money 
from Interwest's bank accounts, Superior makes the absurd assertion that Altius offset the 
money it paid Interwest, on Mr. Pett's behalf, from payments it owed Interwest for 
treatment of others covered by Altius. In its reply memorandum in support of its motion 
for summary judgment, Superior makes the following ludicrous statement: "Is it that 
unusual of a concept that if Interwest did not send a refund check to Altius that Altius 
would of-set the amount against another account. " (Record at 62). 
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question of fact if and how Altius could have "retracted that payment on July 31, 
2005..., " as Superior claims. 
There is simply no evidence that Altius ever "retracted" the payment to Interwest, 
that Superior admits Altius made to Interwest. Gittins' self-serving allegations, set forth 
in her affidavit, do not establish that Altius ever "retracted" any payment to Interwest, 
and, likewise, the alleged "Patient Ledger Analysis" does not establish as a matter of fact 
that Altius ever "retracted" any payment to Interwest. If Superior is going to claim that 
Altius "retracted" any payment to Interwest, it must provide proof in the form of bank 
statements showing that the payment, that it admits Interwest received from Altius, was in 
fact ever "retracted, " as Superior claims.3 
Is it that unusual of a concept that if Justice Orme's check is returned by his bank 
for non sufficient funds that Smiths would collect the amount of Justice Orme's check 
against Justice Billings' account because Justice Orme and Justice Billings have accounts 
at the same bank? Such an assertions is simply inane! 
If Superior has any evidence that Altius ever "retracted" any payment to 
Interwest, then Superior was required to provide that evidence to the trial court and Mr. 
Pett. It did not do so, because it has no such evidence, and, therefore, it cannot do so, 
because Altius did not and could not "retract" any payment it made to Interwest 384 
days after making the payment. 
3. Exhibit A to Gittins5 affidavit, termed a "Patient Ledger Analysis, " appears to be a 
document created expressly for purposes of this litigation, rather than a document that is 
prepared and kept in the ordinary course of business; therefore, the validity and accuracy 
of it are suspect at best. This is especially true because the entries in Exhibit A are not in 
chronological order. The last four entries on page two of the "Patient Ledger Analysis, " 
are dated 6/10/2004, 7/12/2004, 9/1/2004, and 10/1/2005. Those entries follow twelve 
entries in 2005 on page one of the "Patient Ledger Analysis, " ending with the last entry 
on 9/1/2005. If the "Patient Ledger Analysis " was a real business record prepared by 
Interwest at the time the entries allegedly made and kept in the ordinary course of 
business, the "Patient Ledger Analysis " would be in chronological order. The fact that 
they are not clearly establishes that the "Patient Ledger Analysis " is a document created 
expressly for purposes of litigation, rather than a document that is prepared and kept in 
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Because there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether or not the money 
Altius paid to Interwest was in fact "retracted, " there is a genuine issue of fact as to how 
much, if any, Mr. Pett owes to Interwest. Therefore as a matter of law, the trial court 
erred, and committed prejudicial and reversible error, when it granted Superior's motion 
for summary judgment, and, as a matter of law, this Court must reverse the trial court's 
grant of summary judgment in favor of Superior. 
C: BECAUSE SUPERIOR WAS NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS A 
MATTER OF LAW. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL AND 
REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT GRANTED SUPERIOR'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
A party is only entitled to summary judgment if, in addition to there being no 
genuine issues of material fact in a case, the party moving for summary is entitled to 
summary judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c) URCP: "The judgment sought shall be 
rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. (Emphasis 
added). See. Collardv. Nagle Construction, Inc., Hebertson v. Bank One, Parker v. 
Dodgion, CertifiedSur. Group, Ltd. v. UTInc., and Taylor v. OgdenSch. Dist, supra. 
the ordinary course of business. Therefore, anything contained in it, and any reference to 
it, should have been ignored when the trial court ruled on Superior's motion for summary 
judgment, because Gittins did not provide a foundation establishing the "Patient Ledger 
Analysis" to be a business record, and could not provide a foundation establishing the 
"Patient Ledger Analysis" to be a business record, because the "Patient Ledger 
Analysis " is a document created expressly for purposes of this litigation, rather than a 
document that is prepared and kept in the ordinary course of business. 
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In the instant matter, Superior was not entitled to summary judgment as a matter of 
law, because there is a genuine issue of material fact as to how much, if any, Mr. Pert 
owes to Interwest. Therefore, as a matter of law, the trial court was not permitted to grant 
Superior's motion for summary judgment, and this Court, as a matter of law, must reverse 
the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Superior. 
POINT H 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW, AND COMMITTED 
REVERSIBLE AND PREJUDICIAL ERROR WHEN IT WEIGHED THE FACTS 
ON SUPERIOR'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
It is an undeniable fact that, under clear and controlling Utah law, a trial court 
cannot weigh the facts on a motion for summary judgment and/or determine what the 
facts of the case are. 
A trial court is not authorized to weigh facts in deciding a summary judgment 
motion, but is only to determine whether a dispute of material fact exists. Draper 
City v. Estate of Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097, 1100 (Utah 1995) ("On a motion for 
summary judgment, a trial court should not weigh disputed evidence, and its sole 
inquiry should be whether material issues of fact exist").... 
Pigs Gun Club, Inc. v. Sanpete City., supra. 
In Hill v. Grand Central, Inc., supra, the Utah Supreme Court stated that a motion 
for summary judgment can "never be used to determine what the facts are, but only to 
ascertain whether there are any material issues of fact in dispute." See also. W,M. 
Barnes Co. V. Sohio Natural Resources Co., 627 P.2d 56 (Utah 1981) holding "On a 
motion for summary judgment, it is not appropriate for a court to weigh disputed 
evidence concerning such factors, " znASporv. Crested Butte Silver Mining, Inc., 740 
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P.2d 1304 (Utah 1987), declaring: "the sole inquiry to be determined is whether there is 
a material issue of fact to be decided. " 
In Singlketib v, Alexander, 19 Utah 2d 292, 431 P.2d 126 (1967), the Utah 
Supreme Court declared that a "Court cannot consider weight of testimony or credibility 
of witness on motion for summary judgment; court simply determines that there is no 
disputed issues of material fact and that as a matter of law one party should prevail " 
It will be noted that a summary judgment can be granted only when it is shown 
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party 
also is entitled to judgment as a matter of law under those facts. The court cannot 
consider the weight of testimony or the credibility of witnesses in considering a 
motion for summary judgment. He simply determines that there is no disputed 
issue of material fact and that as a matter of law a party should prevail 
LI. 
However, inasmuch as the party moved against is being defeated without the 
privilege of a trial, the court should carefully scrutinize the ''submissions " and 
contentions he makes thereon to see if his contentions and proposals as to proof of 
material facts, if resolved in his favor, would entitle him to prevail; and if it so 
appears, the motion for summary judgment should be denied and a trial should be 
had for the purpose of resolving the disputed issues of fact and determining the 
rights of the parties. 
Rich v. McGovern, 551 P.2d 1266 (Utah 1976), citing Transamerica Title Ins. Co. v. 
United Resources Inc., 24 Utah 2d 346, 471 P.2d 165 (Utah 1970). 
In the instant matter, the trial court improperly and unlawfully weighed the alleged 
evidence and made improper and unlawful factual determinations concerning the alleged 
evidence in the case. In its memorandum decision dated December 28, 2006, the trial 
court made the following statements in a pathetic attempt to justify its memorandum 
decision dated December 1, 2006, wherein it stated that Superior's motion for summary 
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judgment was granted "for the reasons set forth in the Plaintiffs Memorandum of Points 
and Authorities and in its Reply Memorandum, the motion is granted" 
In its memorandum decision of December 28, 2006 the trial court stated: 
A statement of facts must be supported by an affidavit, and moreover, must be 
material or facts pertinent to the issue at hand to preclude summary judgment 
Though most of the facts contested in Defendant's statement go to some of the 
underlying issues, none of them go to the heart of the issue, whether Defendant is 
indebted for services received. (Emphasis added), (Record at 102). 
Specifically, Defendant first asserts Plaintiff was paid for the medical services 
provided to Mr. Pett fr. daughter and therefore, the Plaintiff is not entitled to 
summary judgment Yet there is no issue of fact with respect to that The fact 
Defendant's daughter received services is undisputed and to suggest that "it is not 
reasonable or logical to assume that Mr. Pett 9s insurance carrier could or would 
retract a payment it made to Intern? est 384 days earlier, and that Plaintiff offers no 
explanation as to how Mr. Pett 9s insurance carrier was able to retract a payment 
it made more than a year earlier, " does not necessarily raise an issue of fact 
Simply making a blanket assertion that an insurance carrier retracted a payment 
does not raise a material issue of fact that Defendant is not obligated for the 
alleged debt (Emphasis added), (Record at 103). 
To suggest that he had no knowledge of the debt, or that it may have been paid by 
his insurance carrier does not negate the claim by the Plaintiff that the Defendant 
is indebted and owes for the services provided. (Emphasis added), (Record at 103). 
The allegation that he was never informed of the obligation and the question as to 
whether Interwest was in fact paid does not an issue of fact create to dispute his 
underlying obligation. (Emphasis added), (Record at 103). 
By stating: 
Though most of the facts contested in Defendant's statement go to some of the 
underlying issues, none of them go to the heart of the issue, whether Defendant is 
indebted for services received, 
the trial court admits that Mr. Pett's affidavit disputes the factual allegations contained in 
Superior's memorandum. However, the trial court then weighs the statements contained 
in Mr. Pett's affidavit and the statements in Superior's memorandum and improperly 
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ews the disputed facts in the light most favorable to Superior, while completely 
ignoring facts Mr. Pett's affidavit establishes that there is a genuine dispute to that 
amount, if any, Mr. Pett owes Interwest. 
By stating: 
Specifically, Defendant first asserts Plaintiff was paid for the medical services 
provided to Mr. Pett 9s daughter and therefore, the Plaintiff is not entitled to 
summary judgment. Yet there is no issue of fact with respect to that. The fact 
Defendant's daughter received services is undisputed and to suggest that "it is not 
reasonable or logical to assume that Mr. Pett 9s insurance carrier could or would 
retract a payment it made to Interwest 384 days earlier, and that Plaintiff offers no 
explanation as to how Mr. Pett's insurance carrier was able to retract a payment 
it made more than a year earlier, " does not necessarily raise an issue of fact 
Simply making a blanket assertion that an insurance carrier, (Emphasis added) 
the trial court admits that there is a genuine issue of fact as to how much, if any, Mr. Pett 
owes Interwest. 
The trial court stated: 
Defendant first asserts Plaintiff was paid for the medical services provided to Mr. 
Pett's daughter and therefore, the Plaintiff is not entitled to summary judgment 
Yet, there is no issue of fact with respect to that 
Then in a most incredible leap of illogical, irrational, unreasonable, fallacious, and 
specious lack of reasoning, the trial court states the fact that Superior admits that Altius 
paid Interwest for the service allegedly rendered on behalf of Mr. Pett's daughter "does 
not necessarily raise an issue offacf as to how much, if any, Mr. Pett allegedly owes 
Interwest. That assertion is so inane it defies description, and it is an impermissible 
weighing of factual disputes and viewing the disputed facts in the light most favorable to 
Superior. 
The trial court's statement that: 
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To suggest that he had no knowledge of the debt, or that it may have been paid by 
his insurance carrier does not negate the claim by the Plaintiff that the Defendant 
is indebted and owes for the services provided, 
is another statement that is so ludicrous it defies all logic and reason. The trial court first 
admits that Interwest may have been paid by Altius for any services it alleged rendered on 
behalf of Mr. Pett and then states that the fact that Interwest may have been paid "does 
not negate the claim by the Plaintiff that the Defendant is indebted and owes for the 
services provided. " That assertion is so inane it defies description, and it is an 
impermissible weighing of factual disputes and viewing the disputed facts in the light 
most favorable to Superior. 
The trial court's assertion that: 
The allegation that he was never informed of the obligation and the question as to 
whether Interwest was in fact paid does not an issue of fact create to dispute his 
underlying obligation, 
is also so ludicrous it defies all logic and reason. The trial court admits that there is an 
issue as to whether or not Interwest was paid for any services it allegedly provided on 
behalf of Mr. Pett, but then states that the fact that Interwest may have been paid for 
those services is irrelevant and does not create an issue of fact as to how much, if any, 
Mr. Pett may owe Interwest. That assertion is so also inane it defies description, and it is 
an impermissible weighing of factual disputes and viewing the disputed facts in the light 
most favorable to Superior. 
Because the trial court improperly and unlawfully weighed the alleged evidence 
and made improper and unlawful factual determinations concerning the evidence in the 
case, the trial court eired as a matter of law and committed reversible and prejudicial 
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error when it granted Superior's motion for summary judgment. Therefore, as a matter of 
law, this Court must reverse the trial courts grant of summary judgment in favor of 
Superior. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW, AND COMMITTED 
REVERSIBLE AND PREJUDICIAL ERROR WHEN IT VIEWED THE 
ALLEGED EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE IN THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO 
SUPERIOR. 
Utah appellate courts have also consistently and repeatedly held that, on a motion 
for summary judgment, a trial court is required to view all disputed factual allegations in 
a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Tretheway v. Miracle Mortgage, Inc., 
supra, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
"On a motion for summary judgment, a trial court should not weigh disputed 
evidence, and its sole inquiry should be whether material issues of fact exist. "). 
viewing the facts and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in a light 
most favorable to the nonmoving party. (Emphasis added). 
In Controlled Receivables, Inc. v. Barman, 413 P.2d 807 (Utah, 1966), the Utah 
Supreme Court stated: 
A motion for summary judgment is a harsh measure, and for such reason 
contentions of party opposing the motion must be considered in a light most 
advantageous to him and all doubts resolved in favor of permitting him to go to 
trial and motion should be granted only when, viewing the matter thusly, no right 
to recovery could be established. (Emphasis added). 
Summary judgment is a drastic remedy and courts should be reluctant to deprive 
litigants of an opportunity to fully present their contentions upon a trial, and 
therefore, summary judgment should be granted only when under the facts viewed 
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff he could not recover as a matter of law. 
(Emphasis added). 
Welchman v. Wood, 337 P.2d 410 (Utah, 1959). 
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In the instant matter, the trial court not only improperly and unlawfully weighed 
the alleged facts in this case, but it also undisputedly viewed the alleged facts in a light 
most favorable to Superior when it considered and ruled on Superior's motion for 
summary judgment. As set forth in Point II of this brief, when the trial court made the 
following inane conclusions, it not only improperly and unlawfully weighed the disputed 
facts in this case, it also viewed those disputed facts in a light most favorable to superior: 
A statement of facts must be supported by an affidavit and moreover, must be 
material or facts pertinent to the issue at hand to preclude summary judgment 
Though most of the facts contested in Defendant's statement go to some of the 
underlying issues, none of them go to the heart of the issue, whether Defendant is 
indebted for services received. (Emphasis added). 
Specifically, Defendant first asserts Plaintiff was paid for the medical services 
provided to Mr. Pett 's daughter and therefore, the Plaintiff is not entitled to 
summary judgment Yet, there is no issue of fact with respect to that The fact 
Defendant's daughter received services is undisputed and to suggest that "it is not 
reasonable or logical to assume that Mr. Pett 9s insurance carrier could or would 
retract a payment it made to Interwest 384 days earlier, and that Plaintiff offers no 
explanation as to how Mr. Pett's insurance carrier was able to retract a payment 
it made more than a year earlier, " does not necessarily raise an issue of fact. 
Simply making a blanket assertion that an insurance carrier retracted a payment 
does not raise a material issue of fact that Defendant is not obligated for the 
alleged debt (Emphasis added). 
To suggest that he had no knowledge of the debt, or that it may have been paid by 
his insurance carrier does not negate the claim by the Plaintiff that the Defendant 
is indebted and owes for the services provided. (Emphasis added). 
The allegation that he was never informed of the obligation and the question as to 
whether Interwest was in fact paid does not an issue of fact create to dispute his 
underlying obligation. (Emphasis added). 
Because the trial court is prohibited by clear and controlling Utah law from 
weighing facts and because the trial court was required to view all disputed facts in a 
light most favorable to Mr. Pett, the trial court committed prejudicial and reversible error 
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when it granted Superior's motion for summary judgment. Therefore, as a matter of law, 
this Court must reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Superior. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL AND 
REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT FAILED TO STRIKE THE AFFIDAVIT OF 
WENDY GITTINS AND THEN RELIED ON HER AFFIDAVIT IN RULING ON 
SUPERIOR'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
In pertinent part, Rule 56(e) URCP, (hereinafter "Rule 56"), provides as follows: 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and 
opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts 
as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is 
competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all 
papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or 
served therewith. (Emphasis added). 
Gittins' affidavit is not based on personal knowledge, as required by Rule 56(€) URCP. 
Therefore, the trial court was required to strike it and not rely on it when ruling on 
Superior's motion for summary judgment. 
In paragraph 3, page 2, of her affidavit Gittins states: tlBasedupon my personal 
knowledge, memory, and review of the Defendant 's account in this matter, I have 
determined the following:" (Record, at 30). 
In paragraph 4, page 2, of her affidavit Gittins states: "On or about May 27, 2004, 
Heather Pett, born September 16, 1999, the defendant's daughter, in Cache County, State 
of Utah obtained services and supplies from Interwest Anesthesia, and the principal 
charge was $572. 00. " (Record, at 30). 
In paragraph 5, page 2, of her affidavit Gittins states: "The Defendant promised to 
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pay for these services and supplies, signed a contract (the "Agreement"). (Record, at 
30). 
In paragraph 6, page 2, of her affidavit Gittins states: "The Agreement provides 
that among other services that may be provided are anesthesia. " (Record, at 30). 
In paragraph 7, page 2, of her affidavit Gittins states: "The Agreement provides 
that Defendant, in addition to paying for the service and supplies, he is liable for interest 
at 18% per annum, court costs, the costs of collection, which includes a collection fee, 
and attorney 'sfees incurred in the collection process. " (Record, at 30). 
In paragraph 8, page 2, of her affidavit Gittins states: "The Agreement states under 
paragraph 2: FINANCIAL AGREEMENT: I agree to pay for all services and supplies 
rendered to the patient in accordance with the rates and financial policies in effect at the 
time of service. " (Record, at 30). 
In paragraph 9, page 2, of her affidavit Gittins states: "Paragraph 3 states: "I 
understand that I am responsible for any and all charges not covered by my insurance 
policy(s). " (Record, at 30). 
In paragraph 10, page 2, of her affidavit Gittins states: "Per the terms of the 
Agreement, and in order to make sure that Interwest Anesthesia is made whole, a 
collection charge was added to the account in the amount of $317.57prior to referral to 
Superior. " (Record, at 30). 
In paragraph 11, page 2, of her affidavit Gittins states: "The Defendant breached 
the Agreement by not paying for the services and supplies. " (Record, at 31). 
In paragraph 12, page 2, of her affidavit Gittins states: "On or about July 12, 2004 
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the Defendant's insurance company, Altius, sent a payment, in the amount of $334.62, to 
Interwest Anesthesia. " (Record, at 31). 
In paragraph 13, page 2, of her affidavit Gittins states: "However, Altius retracted 
that payment on July 31, 2005, because on or about February 25, 2005, Altius paid the 
Defendant $514.80, to pay for the services and supplies provided by Interwest Anesthesia 
to the Defendant's daughter on or about May 27, 2004. " (Record, at 31). 
In paragraph 14, page 2, of her affidavit Gittins states: "We sent statements to the 
Defendant on a regular basis. On the account statement, when there is a finance charge, 
those dates that we sent statements. Finally, on September 2005, Interwest Anesthesia 
sent a precollection letter to the defendant, which included a copy of the account 
statement to day, requesting payment. " (Record, at 31). 
In paragraph 3, page 2, of her affidavit Gittins states: "Based upon my personal 
knowledge, memory, and review of the Defendant 9s account in this matter... " (Record, at 
31). Gittins' memory and review of the Defendant's account is not personal knowledge 
as mandated by Rule 56. Gittins' "review of the Defendant 's account in this matter" 
does not qualify as personal knowledge, as required by Rule 56(e). While Mr. Pett's 
account, so long as it contains only documents prepared and kept in the ordinary course 
of business may be admissible, that fact does not mean that Mr. Pett's account is within 
Gittins' personal knowledge, and Gittins cannot testify from personal knowledge and 
base her affidavit on her personal interpretation of the alleged contents of Mr. Pett's 
account. Therefore, any portion of her affidavit that is based on her alleged "review of the 
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Defendant 's account in this matter,,. " is improper testimony in an affidavit and it should 
have been stricken by the trial court. 
Likewise, any of Gittins' statements in her Affidavit based on her alleged "review 
of the Defendant ls account in this matter,., "must be stricken because her affidavit does 
not contain "sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an 
affidavit. " as mandated by Rule 56. Therefore, any portion of her affidavit that is based 
on her alleged "review of the Defendant 's account in this matter.., "is improper 
testimony in an affidavit and it should have been stricken by the trial court. 
All of Gittins' affidavit after paragraph 3 should have been stricken because all of 
those subsequent paragraphs are her personal conclusions. Affidavits must be based on 
personal knowledge of facts not conclusions. 
As previously set forth in this Brief, in paragraph 3, page 2, of her affidavit Gittins 
states: "Based upon my personal knowledge, memory, and review of the Defendant 's 
account in this matter. I have determined the following:" (Record, at 31). (Emphasis 
added). By making the statement "I hcn?e determined the following." Gittins is 
unequivocally stating that everything in her affidavit after paragraph 3 is something that 
she has personally determined, not that she knows, not even something that she believes 
or that even she may remember, but something that she has determined. Rule 56 does not 
permit affidavits to be based on a person's opinion, conclusions or determinations. 
Because Gittins unequivocally states that everything in her affidavit after 
paragraph 3 is something that she has deteimined, as a matter of law, paragraphs 4 
through 14 of her affidavit should have been stricken by the trial court. Statements in an 
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affidavit that are inadmissible because they are not based on personal knowledge must be 
stricken. 
"[Inadmissible evidence cannot be considered in ruling on a motion for summary 
judgment," D & L Supply v. Saurini, 775 P.2d 420, 421 (Utah 1989), so an 
affidavit which does not meet the requirements of rule 56(e) may be subject to a 
motion to strike. Howick v. Bank of Salt Lake, 28 Utah 2d 64, 65, 498 P.2d 352, 
353-54 (1972). 
GNS Partnership v. Fullmer, 873 P.2d 1157 (Ut. App. 1994). 
Because Gittins affidavit is not based on personal knowledge, as required by Rule 
56, as a matter of law, the trial court was required to strike. Because the trial court failed 
and refused to strike Gittins affidavit and then relied on her affidavit when ruling on 
Superior's motion for summary judgment, it erred as a matter of law and committed 
prejudicial and reversible error when ruling on Superior's motion for summary judgment. 
Therefore, as a matter of law, this Court must reverse the trial court's grant of summary 
judgment in favor of Superior. 
POINT V 
INTERWEST IS NOT ENTITLED TO INTEREST AT THE RATE OR 18%. 
NOR IS INTEWEST ENTITLED TO RECOVER ANY ALLEGED ATTORNEY'S 
FEES IN THIS MATTER. 
Because Mr. Pett never entered into any signed agreement or contract with 
Superior whereby he agreed to pay Superior 18% interest or attorney's fees, the trial court 
erred, as a matter of law, and committed prejudicial and reversible error when it awarded 
Superior interest at 18% interest and attorney's fees when it improperly and unlawfully 
granted Superior's motion for summary judgment. 
Although Mr. Pett did sign a "Consent and Conditions of Treatment" with Cache 
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Valley Speciality Hospital, he never signed any agreement, of any nature whatsoever with 
either Intewest or Superior. Mr. Pett did not even know of Interwesf s existence or of 
Superior's existence at the time he signed the "Consent and Conditions of Treatment" 
with Cache Valley Speciality Hospital. A party cannot enter into an agreement or a 
contract with an unknown party. There can not be a meeting of the minds with an 
unknown party, and a party cannot be held liable to an assignee if he does not receive 
notice of an assignment of an alleged debt.4 
The "Consent and Conditions of Treatment" does contain the following language: 
1. CONSENT TO TREAT: I consent to the treatment or admission of 
at the Cache Valley Speciality Hospital for 
services or supplies that have been may be ordered by a licensed professional 
healthcare provider. I understand that treatment may include but is not limited to: 
radiological examinationsf laboratory procedures, physical therapy, anesthesia, 
4. Notification to a debtor of an assignment of the debt is indispensable if the debtor 
is to be held liable to the assignee. If the debt is to be discharged by payment to 
someone other than the creditor because of that assignment, unambiguous 
notification of the change must be given the debtor; 
Timing of the notification of an assignment can be critical to the validity of 
assignment because timing can affect the substantive right of the debtor to offset 
other credits or defenses the debtor has against the debt. In Time Finance Corp. v. 
Johnson Trucking Co., 23 Utah 2d 115, 458 P.2d873, 875 (Utah 1969), notice of 
an intended assignment was given a debtor's agent prior to the actual execution of 
the assignment. However, no notice of the actual assignment was given. The Court 
held that notice of the intended assignment was not valid notice and therefore the 
assignment itself was not effective. Quoting C.I.T Corp. v. Glennan, 137 Cal. 
App. 636, 31 P. 2d 430, 431 (1934), the Court explained that '"an assignee, in 
order to protect himself cannot remain silent... [TJo protect his rights, the 
assignee must notify the debtor of the assignment, since the latter is entitled to all 
setoffs and defenses he may have or may acquire against the assignor, until he is 
notified of the assignment.'" Time Fin., 458 P.2d at 876. 
Webb v. BrinkerhoffConstr. Co, 972 P.2d 74 (Utah 1988) 
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nursing care or medical and surgical treatment I understand that all licensed 
professional healthcare providers that render service to the patent are responsible 
and liable for their own acts, orders and omissions, I acknowledge that the 
hospital has not made no can it make a guarantee of the outcome of treatment. 
2. FINANCIAL A GREEMENT: I agree to pay for all services and supplies 
rendered to the patient in accordance with the rates and financial policies in effect 
at the time of service. I authorize any overpayment made on this account to be 
transferred to any other account balance for which I am responsible. I agree to 
pay interest fees on any unpaid balance after 60 days of discharge or date of 
service at a rate not to exceed 18% Apr. If this account is assigned to an attorney 
or collection agency for collection then I agree to pay all collection fees, court 
costs, and attorney's fees. 
In his affidavit Mr. Pett testifies that he never received any bills from Interwest for 
any services allegedly provided on his behalf and that he never received any notice that 
Interwest's claim for its alleged services had been assigned to Superior. (Record, at 55). 
The trial court even admitted that there was an issue of fact as to whether or not Mr. Pett 
had any knowledge of any amount he allegedly owes Interwest or that Superior had ever 
informed him that it had been assigned the alleged debt of Mr. Pett to Interwest. In its 
December 28, 2006 memorandum decision states: 
The rather oblique arguments that the Defendant never received a collection letter 
or a pre-collection letter, or was billed on a regular basis, has nothing to do with 
the underlying claim here. 
Neither Superior not Interwest provided any copies of any collection letters or 
billing statements either of them allegedly sent to Mr. Pett. As a basic matter of fact and 
logic, Mr. Pett could not pay an obligation of which he had no knowledge. Therefore, 
Mr. Pett cannot be legally required to pay court costs, interest and attorney's fees on an 
alleged debt of which he had no knowledge. A notice of an alleged obligation and a 
demand for payment must made before an alleged creditor is permitted to file a lawsuit in 
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order to extract court costs, interest and attorney fees from an alleged debtor. 
Therefore, even assuming that Altius did not pay Interwest for any services 
allegedly provided on Mr. Pett's behalf or did not pay the entire amount Interwest claims 
it is owed for any services allegedly rendered on behalf of Mr. Pett, neither Interwest nor 
Superior were entitled to file suit against Mr. Pett without first notifying Mr. Pett of the 
alleged obligation and giving him the opportunity to dispute or pay the alleged obligation. 
Neither Interwest nor Superior are entitled to simply file suit against Mr. Pett without first 
notifying him of alleged obligation, Webb v. Brinkerhoff Constr. Co, supra. Therefore, 
not only is Superior not entitled to court costs, interest and/or attorney's fees, the alleged 
assignment to Superior by Interwest is invalid without proper notice to Mr. Pett of the 
alleged assignment, Webb v. Brinkerhoff Constr. Co, supra. 
Because there is a genuine issue of fact as to whether or not either Interwest or 
Superior ever notified Mr. Pett that he allegedly owed Interwest for any services allegedly 
provided on his behalf, the trial court erred as a matter of law, in awarding Superior court 
costs, interest at 18% and attorney's fees, when it improperly and unlawfully granted 
Superior's motion for summary judgment. Therefore, as a matter of law, this Court must 
reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Superior and reverse the 
trial court's award of court costs, interest at 18% and attorney's fees to Superior, as 
specified in the trial court' improper and unlawful grant of summary judgment in favor of 
Superior. 
-28-
CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF 
The trial court erred, as a matter of law, and committed prejudicial and reversible 
error when it granted Superior's motion for summary judgment. The trial court erred, as 
a matter of law, and committed prejudicial and reversible error when it weighed disputed 
facts in this case. The trial court erred, as a matter of law, and committed prejudicial and 
reversible error when it viewed the disputed facts in this case in the light most favorable 
to Superior. The trial court erred, as a matter of law, and committed prejudicial and 
reversible error when it failed to strike the affidavit of Gittins. The trial court erred, as a 
matter of law, and committed prejudicial and reversible error when it awarded court 
costs, interest at 18% and attorney's fees to Superior. 
Because the trial court erred, as a matter of law, and committed prejudicial and 
reversible error when it granted Superior's motion for summary judgment, when it 
weighed disputed facts in this case, when it viewed the disputed facts in this case in the 
light most favorable to Superior, and when it awarded court costs, interest at 18% and 
attorney's fees to Superior, this Court must, as a matter of law, reverse the trial court's 
grant of summary judgment in favor of Superior. Therefore, Mr. Pett respectfully 
requests that this Court issue an order reversing the trial court's grant of summary 
judgment in favor of Superior and remand this matter back to the district court for further 
proceedings. 
//A 
Respectfully submitted this / / day of November 2007. 
Charles A. Schultz 
Attorney for James E. Pett 
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JONATHAN P. THOMAS, P.C. 
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FileNo.:C05-436 
Superior No.: 18951 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SUPERIOR RECOVERY SERVICES, INC., COMPLAINT 
Plaintiff, 
vs. Case No. 
JAMES PETT Judge: Clint S. Judkins 
Gordon J. Low 
Defendant. Thomas L. Willmore 
The Plaintiff, Superior Recovery Services, Inc., ("Superior"), hereby complains of James 
Pert (the "Defendant") and for cause of action alleges the following: 
PARTIES 
1. Superior is a Utah corporation duly licensed as a collection agency. 
2. The Defendant is an individual residing in County, State of Utah. 
JURISDICTION & VENUE 
3. Venue is proper in this court because this action involves services and supplies 
that were provided in Cache County, State of Utah, and a contract that was executed in Cache 
County, State of Utah. 
GENERAL FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 
4. The Defendant, or a member of the Defendant's family, obtained services and 
supplies from the Plaintiffs assignor, Interwest Anesthesia, in Cache County, Utah. 
5. At that time, the Defendant promised to pay for these services and supplies, and 
signed an agreement (the "Agreement"), a copy of which is attached hereto and incorporated by 
reference as Exhibit "A." 
6. The Defendant breached the Agreement by not paying for the services and 
supplies. 
7. The services and supplies obtained by the Defendant, or the Defendant's family, 
constitute a family expense and are the legal responsibility of the Defendant as provided by §30-
2-9, Utah Code. 
8. The Defendant has failed to pay the debt, despite repeated demands to do so. 
9. The Agreement, which provides that the Defendant is liable for court costs, the 
costs of collection, contract interest, and the attorney's fees incurred in the collection process. 
10. The Defendant's unpaid account was duly and regularly assigned to Superior, 
which included a collection fee. 
11. The Agreement provides for interest at the rate of 18%, per annum, and Superior 
is entitled to interest at the contract rate both before and after judgment. 
12. In the event the Defendant fails to timely defend against this action and a default 
judgment is entered, Superior, pursuant to Rule 73 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, elects 
such attorney's fees in the amount consistent with this Rule. 
13. However, Superior reserves the right to submit an affidavit for actual attorney's 
fees and to motion the Court for reasonable augmented costs and attorney's fees. 
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
14. Superior hereby incorporates Paragraphs 1-13 by reference. 









Accrued Interest at 18.00% 
(Through January 10,2006) 
Collection Fee 
Accrued costs to date (Filing fee: $f 
Estimated Service Fe 
Attorney's fees to date 
Less Payments Made 
TOTAL AMOUNT DUE 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, Superior demands judgment against the Defendants as follows: 
1. Superior be granted relief in accordance with the aforesaid allegations. 
2. For judgment against Defendant in the amount of $1,299.05, and all additional 
sums, including accruing interest at the Agreement rate, court costs, and costs of collection, and 
attorney's fees accrued subsequent to the filing of this action. 
3. For such further relief as the Court deems just and equitable. 
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Charles A. Schultz (4760) 
Attorney for James E. Pett 
222 West 700 South 
Brigham City, Utah 84302 
Phone: 435.225.2636 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, LOGAN DEPARTMENT 
SUPERIOR RECOVERY SERVICE, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 





COMES NOW, James Pett and answers the plaintiffs complaint as follows: 
FIRST DEFENSE 
The plaintiffs complaint fails to state a cause of action upon which relief may be granted. 
7. Mr. Pett denies that the plaintiffs assignor ever provided any services to him. Mr. Pett 
is without knowledge as to whether or not the plaintiffs assignor ever provided seivices on behalf 
of the defendant's family members and therefore denies the allegations set forth in paragraph 7 of 
the plaintiffs complaint. Additionally, Mr. Pett affirmatively asserts that he never entered into 
any agreement with the plaintiffs assignor. 
8. Mr. Pett denies the allegations contained in paragraph 8 of the plaintiffs complaint. 
Mr. Pett affirmatively asserts that he never received any bills, letters or requests for payment from 
the plaintiffs assignor. 
9. Mr. Pett denies the allegations contained in paragraph 9 of the plaintiffs complaint. 
Mr. Pett affirmatively asserts that he never entered into any agreement or contract with the 
plaintiffs assignor. 
10. Mr. Pett denies the allegations contained in paragraph 10 of the plaintiffs complaint. 
11. Mr. Pett denies the allegations contained in paragraph 11 of the plaintiffs complaint. 
Mr. Pett affirmatively asserts that he never entered into any agreement or contract with the 
plaintiffs assignor. 
12. Mr. Pett denies the allegations contained in paragraph 12 of the plaintiffs complaint. 
13. Mr. Pett denies the allegations contained in paragraph 13 of the plaintiffs complaint. 
14. In response to paragraph 14 of the plaintiffs complaint, Mr. Pett reasserts his 
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SIXTH DEFENSE 
(BREACH OF CONTRACT) 
Mr. Pett affirmatively asserts that the plaintifTs assignor breached any contract with him 
by failing and refusing to bill his insurance company for any services allegedly provided to his 
family, as was agreed when Mr. Pett agreed to permit Cache Valley Speciality Hospital to provide 
services to a member of his family. 
SEVENTH DEFENSE 
(UNCLEAN HANDS) 
Ms. Pett affirmatively asserts that the plaintiff and/or the plaintiffs assignor are bared by 
the Doctrine of Unclean Hands from complaining against him, for the reason that the plaintiff 
and/or the plaintiffs assignor have failed and refused to do justice to Mr. Pett and may not now 
ask for justice for themselves. 
EIGHTH DEFENSE 
(BREACH OF COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING) 
Utah law imposes an obligation of good faith and fair dealing in all contracts. The plaintiff 
and/or the plaintiffs assignor breached its obligation of good faith and fair dealing by failing to 
bill Mr. Pett's insurance company for any services allegedly provided to Mr. Pett's family and by 
failing to inform Mr. Pett that the plaintiff and/or the plaintiffs assignor allegedly rendered any 
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failure of limitations, fraud, illegality, laches, license, payment, release, res judicata, statute of 
frauds, statute of limitations, and waiver. Mr. Pett specifically preserves these, and all other, 
affirmative defenses as they are ascertained through further discovery. 
WHEREFORE, having fully answered the plaintiffs complaint, Mr. Pett prays that the 
plaintiffs complaint be dismissed, with prejudice and upon the merits; that Mr. Pett, pursuant to 
the provisions of U.C.A. Section 78-27-56 and Rule 11 URCP, be awarded his attorney's fees and 
court costs incurred by himin defending this bad faith, meritless action, filed by the plaintiff 
and/or its assignor, and for such further and additional relief as the Court deems just and proper. 
Dated this day of February 2006. 
Charles A. Schultz 
Attorney for James E. Pett 
-7-
Jonathan P. Thomas (8513) 
JONATHAN P. THOMAS. P.C. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
31 Federal Avenue 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone: (435) 792-4505 
File No.: C05-436 
Superior No.: 18951 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SUPERIOR RECOVERY SERVICES, INC., 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS 




Defendants. Judge: Gordon J. Low 
Pursuant to Rules 7, 12 & 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff, Superior 
Recovery Services, Inc., ("Plaintiff'), by and through its' attorney, Jonathan P. Thomas, 
respectfully submits the following Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of 
Plaintiffs Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings in the alternative for Summary Judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On or about May 27, 2004, Heather Pett, born September 16, 1999, the Defendant's 
daughter, in Cache County, State of Utah, obtained services and supplies from Interwest 
Anesthesia, and the principal charge was $572.00. Please see the Affidavit of Wendy Gittins 
2. The Defendant promised to pay for these services and supplies, signed a contract (the 
"Agreement'"). Please see the Affidavit of Wendy Gittins. 
3. The Agreement provides that among the services that may be provided are anesthesia. 
Please see the Affidavit of Wendy Gittins. 
4. The Agreement provides that Defendant, in addition to paying for the service and 
supplies, he is liable for interest at 18% per annum, court costs, the costs of collection, which 
includes a collection fee, and the attorney's fees incurred in the collection process. Please see 
the Affidavit of Wendy Gittins. 
5. The Agreement states under paragraph 2: FINANCIAL AGREEMENT: I agree to 
pay for all services and supplies rendered to the patient in accordance with the rates and financial 
policies in effect at the time of service." Please see the Affidavit of Wendy Gittins. 
6. Paragraph 3 states: "I understand that I am responsible for any and all charges not 
covered by my insurance policy(s)." Please see the Affidavit of Wendy Gittins. 
7. Per the terms of the Agreement, and in order to make sure that Interwest Anesthesia is 
made whole, a collection charge was added to the account in the amount of $317.57 prior to 
referral to Superior. Please see the Affidavit of Wendy Gittins. 
8. The Defendant breached the Agreement by not paying for the services and supplies. 
Please see the Affidavit of Wendy Gittins. 
9. On or about July 12, 2004 the Defendant's insurance company, Altius, sent a 
payment, in the amount of $334.62, to Interwest Anesthesia. Please see the Affidavit of Wendy 
Gittins. 
10. However, Altius retracted that payment on July 31, 2005, because on or about 
February 25, 2005, Altius paid the Defendant $514.80, to pay for the services and supplies 
provide by Interwest Anesthesia to the Defendant's daughter on or about May 27, 2004. Please 
see the Affidavit of Wendy Gittins. 
11. Interwest Anesthesia sent statements to the Defendant on a regular basis. On the 
account statement, when there is a finance charge, those are the dates that we sent statements. 
Finally, on September 1, 2005, Interwest Anesthesia sent a pre-collection letter to the Defendant, 
which included a copy of the account statement to day, requesting payment. The Defendant did 
not pay. Please see the Affidavit of Wendy Gittins. 
ARGUMENT 
The Defendant's daughter received services and supplies from Interwest Anesthesia, and 
neither the Defendant nor the Defendant's insurance have paid for these services and supplies. 
The Defendant is responsible for this account for two reasons. First, he signed the 
Agreement to be responsible. The Agreement clearly states: "I agree to pay for all services and 
supplies rendered to the patient . . . " 
The second is based upon the following code section. 
§78-45-3 U.C.A. provides: 
Duty of man. 
(1) Every father shall support his child and every child shall be presumed to be 
in need of the support of his father. Every man shall support his wife when she is 
in need. 
(2) Except as limited in a court order under Section 30-3-5, 30-4-3, or 78-45-
7.15: 
(a) The expenses incurred on behalf of a minor child for reasonable and 
necessary medical and dental expenses, and other necessities are chargeable upon 
the property of both parents, regardless of the marital status of the parents. 
(b) Either or both parents may be sued by a creditor for the expenses described 
in Subsection (2)(a) incurred on behalf of minor children. 
The languages of the above code section is clear. Simply, parents are responsible for 
their children. 
Additionally, in the case of Ottley v. Hill, 446 P.2d 301 (Utah 1968), Mr. Ottley's son, 
who was 4 years of age at the time, was killed when he was struck by an automobile operated by 
defendant Hill. The plaintiff had maintained a medical insurance policy which included 
coverage for his son. At trial the trial court found that the plaintiff incurred $1,180.80 in 
medical expenses and $525.76 in funeral expenses, for a total of $1,706.56 for his son. The 
plaintiff had maintained two insurance policies covering his son, one auto, which paid the 
plaintiff $500.00, and one medical, which paid the plaintiff $1,009.30, for a total of $1,509.30. 
The trial court ruled that under the terms of the insurance policy, the plaintiffs son was a 
beneficiary, which meant that the benefits were part of his estate. The trial court then deducted 
the medical expenses and funeral expenses ($1,706.56) from what was paid under the insurance 
policies ($1,509.30), and awarded the plaintiff special damages representing the difference 
($197.26). id at 397-398. 
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court ruled that the trial court erred in deducting from the 
special damages the amount received by the plaintiff from the insurance carriers, stating that: 
It was the duty of the plaintiff to support his son [citing Burbidge v. Utah Light & 
Traction, Co., 196 P. 556], if he is able to do so, and that duty is imposed by 
statute in this State [citing §30-2-9 U.C.A.; §78-45-3 U.C.A.; and §78-45-4 
U.C.A.]. The duty of support includes the duty of furnishing medical care and 
treatment. The plaintiff being under a legal duty to pay and discharge the costs of 
medical care and treatment and for the burial of his son, he is entitled to recover 
from the defendant those amounts reasonably expended for that purpose. Had 
there been no insurance the plaintiff would have been entitled to recover his out-
of-pocket expenditures for medial care and for burial of his child without 
questions. The fact that the plaintiff at his own expense carried insurance to 
protect against such contingencies should not inure to the benefit of the 
wrongdoer [citing Phillips v. Bennett, 439 P.2d 457].. 
Additionally, in the case of in the case of Berow v. Shields, 159 P. 538, 539 (Utah 1916), 
the Utah Supreme Court stated that in regard to a claim for recovery based upon "family 
expenses" and whether or not they are "necessaries", the Court stated: fc\ . . all that is required by 
the statue is that the things purchased are legitimate or proper family expenses. 
Therefore, the Defendant is responsible for the unpaid portions because, pursuant to §78-
45-3 U.C.A., he is responsible for the medial services and supplies to his son. 
Additionally, the Agreement provides: "I agree to pay interest fees on any unpaid balance 
. . . at a rate not to exceed 18% apr." 
Moreover, the Agreement provides: "If this account is assigned to an attorney or a 
collection agency for collection then I agree to pay all collection agency fees, court costs, and 
attorney's fees." 
CONCLUSION 
In sum, judgment should enter in favor of the Plaintiff and against the Defendant 
consistent with the terms of the Agreement, the Plaintiffs Complaint, and as set forth in this 
Memorandum and the Affidavit of Wendy Gittins. 
DATED this Jj>day of July, 2006. 
JONAT: 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed, first class and postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES, to: 
Charles A. Schultz 
Attorney at Law 
222 West 700 South 
Brigham City, Utah 84302 
DATED this V_ day of July, 2006. 
Charles A. Schultz (4760) 
Attorney for James E. Pett 
222 West 700 South 
Brigham City, Utah 84302 
Phone: 435.225.2636 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, LOGAN DEPARTMENT 
SUPERIOR RECOVERY SERVICE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JAMES E. PETT, 
Defendant. 
INC., MEMORAND UM IN OPPOSITION TO 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS OR IN 
THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Case No. 060100241 DC 
Judge: Gordon J. Low 
COMES NOW, James Pett and submits the following Memorandum in opposition to the 
Plaintiffs motion for judgment on the pleadings or in the alternative for summary judgment 
(hereinafter, "the plaintiffs motion."). 
Although Superior styled its motion as a motion for judgment on the pleadings, it is in fact 
a motion for summary judgment, because it is based on the affidavit of Gittins. When matters 
outside of the pleadings are submitted in conjunction with a motion to dismiss, "Rule 12 requires 
that the motion be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56 
Utah R Civ. P. 12(b), (c), " DOIT. Inc. v. Touche. Ross & Co.. 926 P.2d 835, 838 n. 3 (Utah 
1996). 
Rule 12(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides: 
If on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to 
state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented 
to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment 
and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable 
opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 
According to this rule, even though defendant's motion was initially for dismissal because 
of plaintiffs' failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted under Rule 12(b), 
once the ancillary complaint which was outside the pleadings was presented to and not 
excluded by the court, the motion was properly treated as one for summary judgment 
under Rule 56. Even where a motion is erroneously characterized as a motion to dismiss, if 
matters outside the pleadings are presented and not excluded, the motion is properly 
treated as one for summary judgment. 
Strand v. Associated Students of University of Utah. 561 P.2d 191 (1977). see also Bekins Bar V 
Ranch v. Utah Farm Production Credit Ass'n.. 587 P,2d 151 (Utah 1978); Hughes v. Housely. 
Utah. 599 P.2d 1250 (1979); Harvey v. Sanders. Utah, 534 P.2d 905 (1975); Lind v. Lynch 665 
P.2d 1276 (Utah, 1983). Therefore, superior's motion for judgment on the pleadins must be 
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reviewed and examined under the standard for a summary judgment motion rather than a motion 
for judgment under Rule 12(c). 
STATEMENT OF DISPUTE FACTS 
1. Mr. Pett disputes the assertions set forth in paragraph 1 of the plaintiffs statement of 
facts, set forth in plaintiffs "Memorandum of Points and Authorities, " (hereinafter, "plaintiffs 
memorandum. " Paragraph 1 of the plaintiffs statement of facts is based on the affidavit of a 
Wendy Gittins and her affidavit is based on her review and personal interpretation of alleged 
entries in alleged documents allegedly prepared by the plaintiff However, Gittins does not claim 
that she was present when Ms. Pett was allegedly given any treatment or that she prepared any of 
the documents on which she relies in making her assertions, set forth in her affidavit. Therefore, 
her personal interpretation of the meaning of the contents of any alleged documents allegedly 
prepared by the plaintiff does not establish any fact, even assuming the documents on which she 
allegedly relied are in fact true and accurate that may be admissible under hearsay exceptions. 
The alleged documents speak for themselves and any possible hearsay exception to their 
admissibility does not make their alleged contents undisputed facts.1 
2. Mr. Pett disputes the assertions set forth in paragraph 2 of the plaintiffs statement of 
facts. Mr. Pett never signed any contract or agreement with the plaintiff. £££ the affidavit of 
1. Exhibit A to Gittins' affidavit, termed a "Patient Ledger Analysis, " appears to be a 
document created expressly for purposes of this litigation, rather than a document that is prepared 
and kept in the ordinary course of business. 
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James Pett, a copy of which is attached to this Memorandum as Exhibit 1. Furthermore, the 
document attached to Gittins affidavit as Exhibit B is not an agreement between Mr. Pett and the 
plaintiff, as the plaintiff falsely claims. It is an agreement between Mr. Pett and Cache Valley 
Speciality Hospital. 
3. Mr. Pett disputes the assertions set forth in paragraph 3 of the plaintiffs statement of 
facts to the extent that those assertions imply that Mr. Pett ever entered into any contract for 
agreement with the plaintiff for any services. See Exhibit 1. Furthermore paragraph 3 is simply 
Gittins'' personal interpretation, opinion, and conclusion. It is not as statement of fact. 
4. Mr. Pett disputes the assertions set forth in paragraph 4 of the plaintiffs statement of 
facts to the extent that those assertions imply that Mr. Pett ever entered into any contract for 
agreement with the plaintiff for any services. See Exhibit 1. Furthermore paragraph 4 is simply 
Gittins' personal interpretation, opinion, and conclusion. It is not as statement of fact. 
5. Mr. Pett disputes the assertions set forth in paragraph 5 of the plaintiffs statement of 
facts to the extent that those assertions imply that Mr. Pett ever entered into any contract for 
agreement with the plaintiff for any services. S>££ Exhibit 1. Furthermore paragraph 5 is simply 
Gittins' personal interpretation, opinion, and conclusion. It is not as statement of fact. 
6. Mr. Pett disputes the assertions set forth in paragraph 6 of the plaintiffs statement of 
facts to the extent that those assertions imply that Mr. Pett ever entered into any contract for 
agreement with the plaintiff for any services. See Exhibit 1. Furthermore paragraph 6 is simply 
Gittins' personal interpretation, opinion, and conclusion. It is not as statement of fact. 
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7. Mr. Pett admits that the plaintiff added a collection charge in the amount of $327.57, 
set forth in paragraph 7 of the plaintiffs statement of facts. However, Mr. Pett asserts that the 
plaintiff had no legal right to do so. See Exhibit 1. Furthermore paragraph 7 is again Gittins5 
personal interpretation, opinion, and conclusion. It is not as statement of fact. 
8. Mr. Pett disputes the assertions set forth in paragraph 8 of the plaintiffs statement of 
facts to the extent that those assertions imply that Mr. Pett ever entered into any contract for 
agreement with the plaintiff for any services. &e£ Exhibit 1. Furthermore pai'agraph 6 is simply 
Gittins' personal interpretation, opinion, and legal conclusion. It is not as statement of fact. 
9. Mr. Pett is without knowledge as to whether or not his insurance carrier paid the 
plaintiff the sum of $334.62 to the plaintiff on July 12, 2004; however, Gittins claim that it did 
does not make her claim a fact. 
10. Mr. Pett disputes the assertions set forth in paragraph 10 of the plaintiff's statement of 
facts. Mr. Pett never received any payment from his insurance carrier. His insurance carrier does 
not make direct payments to its insured. See Exhibit 1. Additionally Mr. Pett disputes the 
plaintiffs assertion that his insurance carrier retracted the alleged July 12, 2004 payment to the 
plaintiff on July 31, 2005, some 384 days after it made the alleged payment to the plaintiff. 
11. Mr. Pett disputes the assertions set forth in paragraph 11 of the plaintiff's statement of 
facts. Mr. Pett has never received any letters from the plaintiff or its assignor Interwest 
Anaesthesia. The first Mr. Pett knew that Interwest was claiming he had an outstanding bill is 
when he was served with a summons and complaint in this matter. £fi£ Exhibit 1. 
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ARGUMENT 
THERE ARE GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT PRESENT IN THIS CASE 
WHICH PRECLUDE THIS COURT FROM ENTERING SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN 
FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFF AND THE PLAINTIFF HAS NOT ESTABLISHED THAT 
IT IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
THEREFORE, THE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT MUST BE 
DENIED. 
POINT I 
THERE IS A GENUINE ISSUE AS TO WHETHER OR NOT THE PLAINTIFF WAS 
PAH) FOR ANY MEDICAL SERVICES ALLEGEDLY PROVIDED TO MR. PETT'S 
DAUGHTER. THEREFORE, THE PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT IN THIS MATTER. 
On page 2, % 9, of the plaintiffs statement of facts, set forth in its memorandum of points 
and authorities (hereinafter, "plaintiffs memorandum"), the plaintiff claims that it was paid the 
sum of $334.62 by Mr. Pett's insurance carrier on July 12, 2004. Then on page 2, f^ 10, page 2 of 
the plaintiffs statement of facts, set forth in its memorandum the plaintiff claims that Mr. Pett's 
insurance carrier "However, Altms retracted that payment on July 31, 2005.... " 
It is not reasonable or logical to assume that Mr. Pett's insurance carrier could or would 
retract a payment it made to Interwest 384 days earlier, and the plaintiff offers no explanation as 
to how Mr. Pett's insurance carrier was able to retract a payment it made more than a year earlier. 
Checks are required to clear a bank within 48 hours. Did Interwest not deposit Mr. Pett's 
insurance carrier's payment for more than a year? Does Mr. Pett's insurance carrier have direct 
access to Inerwest's back account, permitting it make deposits and withdrawals as it sees fit? If 
not, how could it retract a payment it made 384 days earlier without Inerwest's consent and 
authority? 
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There is no evidence that Mr. Pett's insurance carrier ever withdrew the payment the 
plaintiff admits it made to Interwest Gittins' self-serving allegations, set forth in her affidavit, do 
not establish that Mr. Pett's insurance carrier ever "retracted" any payment to Interwest, and, 
likewise, the alleged "Patient Ledger Analysis " does not establish as a matter of fact that Mr. 
Pett's insurance carrier ever "retracted" any payment to Interwest. If the plaintiff is going to 
claim that Mr. Pett's insurance carrier "retracted" any payment to Interwest, it must provide proof 
in the form of bank statements showing that the payment, it admits Interwest received from Mr. 
Pett's insurance carrier, was ever "retracted, as the plaintiff claims.2 
Because there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether or not Interwest was paid by 
Mr. Pett's insurance carrier, as a matter of law, this Court cannot grant the plaintiffs motion for 
summary judgment. Therefore, the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment must be denied. 
POINT II 
MR. PETT NEVER SIGNED ANY CONTRACT OR AGREEMENT WITH INTERWEST 
FOR ANY TYPE OF SERVICES. 
Contrary to the plaintiff's assertions, Mr. Pett never signed any contract with Interwest 
whereby he agreed to pay Interwest for any goods, services, materials, supplies or other items 
allegedly provided to him or on his behalf. And Interwest never billed Mr. Pett for any goods, 
2. Likewise, if the plaintiff is going to claim that Mr. Pett received $514.80 from his insurance 
carrier on February 25, 2005, it must provide proof of the alleged payment, i.e., a canceled check 
with Mr. Pett's signature on it depositing it in his bank account or cashing it 
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services, materials, supplier or other items allegedly provided to him or on his behalf. See 
Exhibit 1. 
Although the plaintiff claims that Intewest sent Mr. Pett "statements on a regular basis, " it 
has not included any copies of those alleged "statements " in the documents it has provided to Mr. 
Pett or filed with the Court. Likewise, the plaintiff has failed to provide either the Court or Mr. 
Pett with the "pre-collection letter" it claims it allegedly sent to Mr. Pett on September 1, 2005. 
If Interwest truly sent Mr. Pett (istatements on a regular basis " and/or a "pre-collection letter" it 
was required to attach copies of those alleged documents to its "memorandum" when it filed its 
"motion." The plaintiff cannot simply rely on Gittins' interpretation of the "Patient Ledger 
Analysis " as a factual basis that Interwest ever sent Mr. Pett "statements on a regular basis " 
and/or a "pre-collection letter. "3 
Mr. Pett cannot be required to pay a debt of which he has no knowledge. $££ Exhibit 1. 
POINT III 
MR. PETT CANNOT BE REQUIRED TO PAY A DEBT OF WHICH HE HAS NO 
KNOWLEDGE AND WHICH SHOULD HAVE BEEN, AND MAY HAVE BEEN, PAID 
BY HIS INSURANCE CARRIER. 
The plaintiff is correct in its claim that a man is required to support his children, and that a 
man may be required to pay for the medical expenses incurred on behalf of his minor children. 
However, Mr. Pett is not required to pay a claim for medical expenses of which he has no 
knowledge and which may have been paid by his insurance company. 
3. Plaintiffs memorandum, page 2, ^  11. 
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Contrary to the plaintiffs assertion, Mr. Pett is not "responsible for the unpaid portions 
because, pursuant to §78-45-3 U.C.A., he is responsible for the medical services and supplies to 
his son. "4 Mr. Pett has no son. &e£ Exhibit 1. And although Mr. Pett may be required to pay for 
medical care of his daughter, the plaintiff is not entitled to collect from Mr. Pett without Interwest 
first informing Mr. Pett of any such obligation and without giving Mr. Pett the opportunity to pay 
any alleged obligation after it is made known to him. 
In the instant matter, there is no evidence that Mr. Pett was ever informed of any claim by 
Interwest of any alleged outstanding bill or given the opportunity to pay any alleged bill. There 
is, however, an admission by Inerwest that Mr. Petf s insurance carrier paid Interwest.5 Mr. Pett 
cannot pay a debt of which he has no knowledge. See Exhibit 1. 
Because there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether or not Mr. Pett was ever 
informed of any alleged obligation to pay Interwest for any alleged services and because there is a 
genuine issue as to whether Interwest was in fact paid for any alleged services provided to or on 
behalf of Mr. Pett, this Court cannot grant the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment, based on 
the provisions in the Utah Code that require a man to provide for his minor children and to pay 
their medical expenses. 
4. Plaintiffs memorandum, page 5, % 1. 
5. Plaintiffs memorandum, page 2, % 9. 
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POINT V 
INTERWEST IS NOT ENTITLED TO INTEREST AT THE RATE OR 18%. NOR IS 
INTEWEST ENTITLED TO RECOVER ANY ALLEGED ATTORNEY'S FEES IN THIS 
MATTER. 
Mr. Pett never entered into any signed agreement or contract with Interwest whereby he 
agreed to pay Intewest 18% interest, as the plaintiff falsely claims. Likewise^ Mr. Pett never into 
any signed agreement or contract with Interwest whereby he agreedlxrpay Interwest's attorney's 
fees should his insurance carrier fail to pay for any treatment covered under his health care policy 
The "Agreement" to which the plaintiff refers is not between Interwest and Mr. Pett. It is 
between Mr. Pett and Cache Valley Speciality Hospital. Mr. Pett could not have entered into an 
agreement with Inerwest at the time he signed the "Consent and Conditions of Treatment" which 
is an agreement between Mr. Pett and Cache Valley Speciality Hospital. Mr. Pett did not even 
know of Interwest's existence. A party cannot enter into an agreement or a contract with an 
unknown party. 
Because Mr. Pett never entered into any contract or agreement with Interwest that provides 
for interest at 18% or for recovery of attorney's fees, the plaintiff is not entitled, under any 
circumstances to collect interest at the rate of 18% or to recover any attorney's fees from Mr. Pett. 
Therefore^ the plaintiffs assertion that it is entitled to recover interest at the rate of 18% or to 
recover any attorney's fees from Mr. Pett must be summarily denied.6 
6. Even assuming, arguendo, that the terms of the "Consent and Conditions of 
Treatment" enured to the benefit of Interwest, those terms do not enure to the benefit of 
the plaintiff. If Interwest had sued Mr. Pett in its own name, as plaintiff it could perhaps 
claim that the terms of the "Consent and Conditions of Treatment" enured to the benefit 
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CONCLUSION 
Because there are genuine issues of material fact present in this case, and because the 
plaintiff is not entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law, the plaintiffs motion for 
summary must be summarily denied. 
/s T1 Dated this ' J day of August 2006. 
Charles A. Schultz 
Attorney for James E. Pett 
of Interwest. However, when the plaintiff chose to file the instant action in its own name 
any arguable obligations Mr. Pett had under the the "Consent and Conditions of 
Treatment" did not transfer to the benefit of the plaintiff. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
foregoing Memorandum to the person(s) at the address(es) listed below by depositing a copy in 
I hereby certify that on the / } day of August, I mailed a true and accurate copy of the 
the United States Mail, postage prepaid. 
Jonathan P. Thomas 
31 Federal Ave. 
Logan, UT 84321 
Charles A. Schultz 
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and would so testily if called to do so at trial of this matter. 
2. I have read the affidavit of Wendy Gittins, and many of the tilings she states in 
her affidavit are false. 
3. I never signed any agreement with Inteiwesi Anesthesia Agreement for service 
of any type, 
4. I never promised to pay Interwest any amount for anytxiing, as Gittins states in 
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5. I never even knew tiiat Interwest provided any services to any member of my 
family. 
6. I never knew that Interwest existed until this lawsuit. 
7. The "Consent and Conditions of Treatment attached to Gittins' affidavit is not 
an agreement to pay Interwest; as Gittins falsely claims. It is an agreement for consent 
for treatment and conditions of treatment with Cash Valley Speciality Hospital Interwest 
is not even mentioned in the "Consent and Conditions of Treatment." 
8. Gittins' statements contained in paragraphs 6 through are not true. They deal 
with the "Consent and Conditions of Treatment" with Cash Valley Speciality Hospital, 
not Interwest. 
9. Gittins' claim, as set forth in paragraph 13 of her affidavit, that on February 
25, 2005, Altius paid me $514,80, is not true. I have never received any payment from 
Altius in the fifteen years I have been covered by their insurance. 
10. I have never received any bills from Interwest, as claimed by Gittins in 
paragraph 14 of her affidavit, and I do not believe any were ever sent. 
11. I never received a "pre-collectwn letter, " as claimed by Gittins in paragraph 
14 of her affidavit, and I do not believe any were ever sent. 
12. I did not know that Interwest was claiining that I owed them any amount of 
money or that they were claiming that Altius failed to pay them for any services allegedly 
provided to my daughter, Heather, until I was served with a summons and complaint from 
Superior. 
13. I have no way of knowing if Altius paid Interwest $334.62 on July 12, 2004, 
as Gittins claims in paragraph 12 of her affidavit, however, I never received $514.80 from 
Altius on February 25, 2005. I would remember if, out of the blue, anyone sent me a 
check for $514.80, and if Interwest claims Altius did, where is a copy of the check with 
my signature on it? 
14. Contrary to Superior's false claim, I do not have a son, and I have never had a 
son. 
15. I have never signed any contracts or agreements with Superior for anything 
and I would never do so. 
16. I never knew that Superior existed until I was served with a summons and 
complaint in this lawsuit. 
Dated this / 7 day of August 2006 
Jamejr^. Pert 
Sworn and subscribed to this O day of August 2006 
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Case Number: 060100241 DC 
JUDGE: GORDON J. LOW 
THE ABOVE MATTER is before the Court upon a motion filed by the Plaintiff on July 
31,2006 styled Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings or, in the Alternative, for Summary 
Judgment, but it is more appropriately considered to be a Motion for Summary Judgment. 
For the reasons set forth in the Plaintiffs Memorandum of Points and Authorities and its 
Reply Memorandum, the motion is granted. The Court would suggest that the defenses raised in 
the Memorandum in Opposition appear to be disingenuous. The Plaintiff is granted judgment as 
plead, including interest, costs, and attorney's fees. 
The Court solicits from counsel for the Plaintiff a formal order in conformance herewith, 
together with an Affidavit in support of its claim for attorney's fees. 
Dated this If day of September. 2006. 
BY THE COURT 
, l C ' ! ' ""' v 
/ , • 
2006-08-31/GJL/ts 
. J. £bw, District Court Judge 
7irst District Court 
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Charles A. Schultz (4760) 
Attorney for James £ Pert 
222 West 700 South 
Brigham City, Utah 84302 
Phone 435.225.2636 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, LOGAN DEPARTMENT 
SUPERIOR RECOVERY SERVICE, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JAMES E. PETT, 
Defendant. 
OBJECTION TO FINDINGS OF FACTS 
Case No. 060100241 DC 
Judge, low 
COMES NOW, James Pert and objects to the plaintiffs proposed findings of fact on the 
following grounds: 
1. Although die court ordered the plaintiff to prepare findings of facts, the plamtiff m fact 
prepared no findings of fact. Mr. Pert admits that it would be extremely difficult for the plaintiff 
to prepare any findings of fact, because the court never specified any facts in its memorandum 
decision granting thQ plaintiffs motion for summary judgment. If the court wants the plaintiff to 
prepare findings of fact, the conn should, at the minimum, give some indication of the "facts" 
upon which it based its memorandum decision, even though preparation of factual findings on a 
summary judgment motion is inappropriate. Rule 52(a), U.R.C.P. provides; 
In all actions tried upon thefacis without a jury. . ., the court shall find the facts specially 
and state separately its conclusions of law thereon 
With certain exceptions, not applicable here, the just-quoted rule must he complied with 
and a judgment cannot stand unless there are findings which will justify it The failure of 
the trial court to enter adequate findings requires that the judgment be vacated. 
Anderson v. Utah Cty. Bd. Of Cty. CommVs.. 589 P.2d 1214 (Utah 1984) 
2. It is inappropriate for the court to direct the plaintiff io prepare findings of fact on a 
summary judgment. On summary judgment, it is inappropriate to make findings of fact or to even 
decide facts. On summary judgment a court can only determine that there are no disputed facts. It 
cannot weigh and deteraiine disputed fact, as the court did in this case. 
}1
 Summary judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issues of material fact exist and 
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. "Jones v. ERA Brokers Console 
2000 UT 61, 1 8, 6 P. 3d 1129; see also Utah It Civ. R 56(c). 
Collard v. Nagle Construction. Inc.. 57 P.3d 603 (UT App. 2002). 
Hearing was had on these pleadings, and the tnal court granted summary judgment in 
favor of'Buzas Baseball but also entered findings of fact, which are clearly inappropriate in 
any gnmt of summary'judgment. By definition, summary judgment cannot be granted where 
there are disputed facts. Ron Shepherd Ins., Inc. v. Shields, 882 P 2d 650, 65'-J (Utah 199-IJ 
("Summary Judgment is proper only when no genuine issues of material fact remain.... "). 
Buzas Baseball Inc v. Salt Lake Trappers. Inc., 925 P.2d 941 (Utah 1996). 
3, The plaintiffs proposed finding stating: "The Court finds that the defenses raised in the 
Defendants 7s Memorandum in Opposition appear to be disiingemiovs, " is not a finding of fact. At 
best it is an improper comment based in the court's impermissible weighing of disputed facts. 
A trial court is not authorized to weigh facts in deciding a summary judgment motion, but is 
only to determine whether a dispute of material fact exists, Draper City v. Estate of 
Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097, 1100 (Utah 1995) (On a motion for summary judgment, a trial 
court should not weigh disputed evidence, and its sole inquiry should be whether material 
issues of fact exist."), viewing the facts and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom 
in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Tretheway v. Miracle Mortgage, Inc., 
2000 UT12, V 995 P.2d 599. 
Pigs Gun Club. Inc. v. Sanpete Cty.. 42 P.3d 379 ( Utah 2001), 
For the forgoing reasons the plaintiffs proposed findings, order and judgment should be 
rejected. Furthermore, for the forgoing reasons, the grant of summary judgment in favor of the 
defendant should be vacated, as it will be on appeal. 
Dated this / / ' day of December 2006. 
Charles A Schultz 
Attorney for James E. Pert 
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Jonathan P. Thomas (8513) 
JONATHAN P. THOMAS, P.C. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
31 Federal Avenue 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone: (435) 792-4505 
Fax: (435)752-3556 
Superior No.: 18951 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 





FINDINGS, ORDER, AND JUDGMENT 
Case No.: 060100241 DC 
Judge: Gordon J. Low 
THIS MATTER came before the Court on the Plaintiffs Motion for Judgment on the 
Pleadings or in he alternative for Summary Judgment, which was supported by the Memorandum 
of Points and Authorities. The Defendant has not replied. The Plaintiff subsequently submitted 
an Affidavit of Attorney's Fees, and a Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements. The Court, 
having reviewed the Motion, Memorandums, and Exhibits, and being otherwise fully advised in 
the premises, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED: 
FINDINGS 
The Court finds that the defenses raised in the Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition 
appear to be disingenuous. 
ORDER 
The Plaintiffs Motion is hereby granted. 
JUDGMENT 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Plaintiff be awarded Judgment against the 









Accrued Interest at 18.00% 
(Through December 6, 2006) 
Collection Costs 
Accrued expenses to date (Filing fee: $50.00 
Service Fees: $19.50 
Miscellaneous/Copy Fee: $25.00) 
Attorney's fees to date 
Less Payments Made 
TOTAL AMOUNT DUE 
Interest is to accrue on the total judgment at the current judgment interest rate of 18.00% 
from the date of this Judgment, until paid, plus after-accruing costs. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this Judgment shall be augmented in the amount of 
reasonable costs and attorney fees expended in collecting said Judgment by execution or 
otherwise as shall be established by Affidavit. 
DATED this ZJb day of December, 2006. 
BY THE COT 
District Court Judge 
Entered % 
% 
" • N , ^ 
In the First Judicial District Court 
In and for Cache County, State of Utah 
SUPERIOR RECOVERY SERVICES, 
INC., MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Plaintiffs), j 
Case Number: 060100241 DC 
vs. I 
JUDGE: GORDON J, LOW 
JAMES E. PETT, | 
Defendant(s). j 
THE ABOVE MATTER is before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Strike the 
Affidavit of Wendy Gittins. Procedurally, the Court notes that the initial Complaint was filed on 
the 1st of February, 2006. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed on the 31st of July a Motion for Judgment on 
the Pleadings or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment. Defendant filed a response to that 
motion on the 17th of August, to which Plaintiff then replied on 28th of August. This Court then 
issued & Memorandum Decision on the 1st of September, 2006, granting the motion for summary 
judgment. Defendant then belatedly filed his Motion to Strike on the 5th of September, seeking to 
strike the affidavit supporting Plaintiffs summary judgment motion. In response to this new 
motion, Plaintiff submitted a response on the 13th of September. No further pleadings with 
respect to the motion to strike were submitted. A set of Findings, Order and Judgment was filed 
with the Court by the Plaintiff and subsequently entered by the Court on the 20th of December, 
2006. An objection thereto was filed by the Defendant later that day. 
Defendant's Motion to Strike the Affidavit is late and inappropriate. Leave could have 
been requested by Defendant if he sought to set aside the Court's memorandum decision or to 
otherwise attack the judgment. Defendant is correct, however, in arguing that Plaintiff should not 
have submitted to the Court a set of Findings of Fact. Findings of Fact are not to be provided or 
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entered by the Court upon motion for summary judgment, as the Court does not weigh the facts 
when making summary judgment determinations. It should be noted that the Court did not 
request a set of Findings, but in fact solicited from Plaintiffs counsel a formal order in 
conformance with the memorandum decision granting the motion for summary judgment. 
Concerns raised by Defendant in his Motion to Strike and Opposition to Summary Judgment 
Contrary to the suggestion by the Defendant that the Court made the Findings of Fact, the 
Court observed that the defenses raised in Defendant's memorandum appeared to be 
disingenuous. By way of explanation, in a review of the Defendant's response to the motion for 
summary judgment the Court addressed procedural propriety of that motion. The Court agreed 
that the matter was not for judgment on the pleadings but more properly for a Rule 56 decision. 
In this light, the submitted statement of facts or memorandum of facts thereafter is less than 
helpful. Additionally, the affidavit by Mr. Pett does not aid the Court. A statement of facts must 
be supported by an affidavit, and moreover, must be material or facts pertinent to the issue at 
hand to preclude summary judgment. Though most of the facts contested in Defendant's 
statement go to some of the underlying issues, none of them go to the heart of the issue, whether 
Defendant is indebted for services received. 
Defendant's general argument is that genuine issues of material fact exist which preclude 
the Court from entering a summary judgment. Specifically, Defendant first asserts Plaintiff was 
paid for the medical services provided to Mr. Pett's daughter and therefore, the Plaintiff is not 
entitled to summary judgment. Yet, there is no issue of fact with respect to that. The fact 
Defendant's daughter received services is undisputed and to suggest that "it is not reasonable or 
logical to assume that Mr. Pett's insurance carrier could or would retract a payment it made to 
Interwest 384 days earlier, and that Plaintiff offers no explanation as to how Mr. Pett's insurance 
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carrier was able to retract a payment it made more than a year earlier," does not necessarily raise 
an issue of fact Simply making a blanket assertion that an insurance carrier retracted a payment 
does not raise a material issue of fact that Defendant is not obligated for the alleged debt. Some 
other questions were raised, but there is nothing therein to argue the central point of whether the 
debt was owed The questions raised as to alleged facts without facts to the contrary does not an 
issue of fact create. 
The second point in the Defendant's argument is that he never signed a contract with 
Interwest for any type of services. That is not germain to the issue here. There is no claim that he 
signed an agreement with Interwest for the services. The claim is that he owes Interwest sums for 
services provided. The rather oblique arguments that the Defendant never received a collection 
letter or a pre-collection letter, or was billed on a regular basis, has nothing to do with the 
underlying claim here. 
The third point made by the Defendant is that he should not be required to pay a debt for 
which he has no knowledge of and which should have been, or may have been, paid by his 
insurance carrier. There is nothing under that allegation to suggest that in fact he never received 
the services. To suggest that he had no knowledge of the debt, or that it may have been paid by 
his insurance carrier does not negate the claim by the Plaintiff that the Defendant is indebted and 
owes for the services provided. 
The fourth argument, similar to the third, suggests that the debt wrongly reflected a 
reference to Defendant's son rather than his daughter again fails to raise a material issue of fact. 
Defendant was informed in Plaintiffs Complaint of the obligation and Defendant has never denied 
in his affidavit or otherwise that the services were provided to his child or that they were 
reasonable. The allegation that he was never informed of the obligation and the question as to 
- 3 -
whether Interwest was in fact paid does not an issue of fact create to dispute his underlying 
obligation. 
Defendant's fifth point is that Interwest is not entitled to an interest rate of 18% or any 
attorney's fees Once again, this argument is oblique There is no allegation that Defendant 
signed a contract with Interwest or agreed to pay attorney's fees or interest. However, attached 
to Plaintiffs affidavit of Wendy Gittins is Defendant's undisputed signed agreement with Cache 
Valley Specialty Hospital. That agreement provided for attorney's fees and interest and was 
assignable. Not unlike the response to the motion for summary judgment, the Court finds that 
both the motions to strike the affidavit of Wendy Gittins and the Objection to Findings of Fact are 
without merit. 
Thi5 memorandum decision will serve as notice that the Findings, Order and Judgment 
submitted fry the Plaintiff have been modified on the first line under findings to provide that: 
"The Court finds the defenses raised in the Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition 
appear to be without merit." 
Otherwise, the findings will remain as entered on the 20th of pecember, 2006. 
Counsel for the Plaintiff is now directed to prepare an order denying the motion to strike 
and overruling the objection to the findings of fact. 
Dated thj»< ^ day of \ y z ^ r <0£ 
BY THE COURT 
Jonathan P. Thomas (8513) 
JONATHAN P. THOMAS, P.C. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
31 Federal Avenue 
Logan. Utah 84321 
Telephone: (435) 792-4505 
FileNo.:C05-436 
Superior No.. 18951 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SUPERIOR RECOVERY SERVICES, INC., 
AFFIDAVIT OF WENDY GITTINS 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JAMES PETT, Case No. 060100241 DC 
Defendants. Judge: Gordon J. Low 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss. 
County of Cache ) 
Wendy Gittins, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and states as follows: 
1. That I am a resident of Cache County, State of Utah, I am over the age of 18,1 have 
personal knowledge of the following, except where so stated, and I am competent to testify. 
2. I am the office manager of Interwest Anesthesia, a client of Superior Recovery Inc. 
(''Superior"'), which means I have access to all account information regarding James Petfs (the 
"Defendant") account, aijd that I am a custodian of the records. The records of the Defendant's 
account that I reviewed are kept in the course of a regularly conducted business procedure, and it 
our regular practice to make memorandums, reports, records, or data compilations. 
3. Based upon my personal knowledge, memory, and my review of the Defendant's 
account in this matter, I have determined the following: 
4. On or about May 27, 2004, Heather Pett, born September 16, 1999, the Defendant's 
daughter, in Cache County, State of Utah, obtained services and supplies from Interwest 
Anesthesia, and the principal charge was $572.00. A copy of the account statement is attached 
hereto and incorporated by reference as Exhibit "A. " 
5. The Defendant promised to pay for these services and supplies, signed a contract (the 
"Agreement"). A copy of which is attached hereto and incorporated by reference as Exhibit 
6. The Agreement provides that among the services that may be provided are anesthesia. 
Please see Exhibit A. 
7. The Agreement provides that Defendant, in addition to paying for the service and 
supplies, he is liable for interest at 18% per annum, court costs, the costs of collection, which 
includes a collection fee, and the attorney's fees incurred in the collection process. Please see 
Exhibit A. 
8. The Agreement states under paragraph 2: FINANCIAL AGREEMENT: I agree to 
pay for all services and supplies rendered to the patient in accordance with the rates and financial 
policies in effect at the time of service." Please see Exhibit A. 
9. Paragraph 3 states: "1 understand that 1 am responsible for any and all charges not 
covered by my insurance policy(s)." Please see Exhibit A. 
JO. Per the terms of the Agreement, and in order to make sure that Interwest Anesthesia is 
made whole, a collection charge was added to the account in the amount of $317.57 prior to 
referral to Superior. Please see Exhibit A. 
11. The Defendant breached the Agreement by not paying for the services and supplies. 
12 On or about July 12, 2004 the Defendant's insurance company, Altius, sent a 
payment, in the amount of $334.62, to Interwest Anesthesia. Please see Exhibit A. 
13. However, Altius retracted that payment on July 31, 2005, because on or about 
February 25, 2005, Altius paid the Defendant $514.80, to pay for the services and supplies 
provide by Interwest Anesthesia to the Defendant's daughter on or about May 27, 2004. Please 
see Exhibit A. 
14. We sent statements to the Defendant on a regular basis. On the account statement, 
when there is a finance charge, those are the dates that we sent statements. Finally, on 
September 1, 2005, Interwest Anesthesia sent a pre-collection letter to the Defendant, which 
included a copy of the account statement to day, requesting payment. The Defendant did not 
pay. Please see Exhibit A. 
V E R I F I C A T I O N 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
County of Cache ) 
Wendy Gittins, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: That she has read the above 
and foregoing knows the contents thereof and the facts alleged therein are true to her own best 
knowledge, understanding that she does so under penalty of jperjura 
On the ^Jj_ day of July, 2006, personally appeared before me, Wendy Gittins, the signer 
of the written instrument, who duly acknowledged thatjjje executed the same. 
i • " 3 5 ? - VOTARY PUBLIC \ 
M ^ h ^VN MEADE 
I i*Y*t&&*j v"\ "'*• Commission Expires 
V&*%ft# / "-' P ° Box 352 
< > N ^ ^ ; > ' Lujan Utah 84323 
^ ^ ^ v - irArE 0f [!TAH 
Notary Public 
Run Date: 1/1/2005 InterWest Anesthesia Associates 
274 N Main St 
Logan, UT 84321-3915 USA 
Patient Ledger Analysis 
PETT 
Init Bal: S 0.00 
HEATHER 
Ins. Bal- $ 0.00 
Patient #: 20,644 
Pat. Bal. $ 952.71 
Date of Birth 9/16/1993 
Total Bal: S 952.71 SSN: 
r^ isi 
Active Charges Only 
Phone: (435)512-1821 
Charge Seq. #: 66,006 Primary: ALTIUS ALTIUS 
Charge Amount: $ 572.00 P. Status: Resolved S. Status: 
Item# From To POS CPT# Procedure Description 
Charge Balance: S635.14 
Trans. Date5/27/2004 Trans. Seq. #: 66006 
Secondary: 
Attending Physician: JRR Trans Date 5/27/200 
Mod ICD# Charges Days or Units 
Source: Charges 
5/27/2004 5/27/2004 22 00170 INTRAORAL PROCEDURES PI 474.10 
Aim: S572.00 
$572.00 11.00 
Trans. Date:! 1/1/2004 Trans. Seq. #: 107253 Item #: -1 Source: Adjustment - PATIENT 
Interest 
FINANCE Amt: $4.60 
Trans. Date:l2/1/2004 Trans. Seq. #: 115577 Item#:-1 Source: Adjustment - PATIENT 
Interest 
FINANCE Amt: $3.70 
Trans. Date:l/l/2005 Trans. Seq. *: 123499 Item #: -1 Source: Adjustment - PATIENT 
Interest 
FINANCE Amt: $3.88 
Trans. Date2/l/2005 Trans. Seq. #: 133259 Item #: -1 Source: Adjustment - PATIENT 
Interest 
FINANCE Amt: $3.94 
Trans. DateS/1/2005 Trans. Seq. #: 141287 Item #: -1 Source: Adjustment - PATIENT 
Interest 
FINANCE Amt: $3.61 
Trans. Date:4/l/2005 Trans. Seq. 3: 150429 Item #: -1 Source: Adjustment - PATIENT 
Interest 
FINANCE Amt: $4.05 
Trans. Date5/1/2005 Trans. Seq. #: 159975 Item #: -1 Source: Adjustment - PATIENT 
Interest 
FINANCE Amt: $3.98 
Trans. Daterf/1/2005 Trans. Seq. #: 169446 Item #: -1 Source: Adjustment - PATIENT 
Interest 




Trans. Date:7/28/2005 Trans. Seq. #: 186218 Item #: 1 Source: Payment - PATIENT PRI INS Amt: 
ALTIUS PAID YOU $514.80 ON 2/25/05. PAYMENT IN FULL IS DUE IMMEDIATELY. ALTIUS IS RETRACTING THE 
PAYMENT MADE TO US. PLEASE CONTACT US IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS. THANK YOU! 
Trans. Date:7/31/2005 Trans. Seq. #: 187320 Item #: 1 Source: Payment - UNITED UNITED2 R 
07/31/05 REFUND ALTIUS CK 5254 








Trans. DateS/1/2005 Trans. Seq. #: 1 ^5723 
PRE-COLLECT LETTER SENT 
Source: PC Amt: 
FINANCE Amt: Trans. DateS/1/2005 Trans. Seq. #: 195906 Item #: -1 Source: Adjustment - PATIENT 
EXHIBIT "A" 
$9.56 
Run Date: •" 11/1/2005 InterWest Anesthesia Associates 
274 N Mam St 
Logan, UT 84321-3915 USA 
Patient Ledger Analysis Active Charges Onl^  
PLT1 HEATHER Patient #: 20,644 DaieofBmh: 9/16/1993 Phone: (435)512-1821 
Imt Bal: $ 0.00 Ins. Bal: $ 0.00 Pat. Bal: $ 952 71 Total Bal: $ 952.71 SSN: 
Trans. Date£/10/2004 Trans. Seq. #: 67551 Source: 1st Carrier Claim Generated: ALTIt Amt: 
Primary Generated. OutputType: PRINTED 
Trans. Date:7/12/2004 Trans. Seq. #: 77896 Item U: 1 Source: Payment - ALTIUS ALTIUS PRI INS Amt: ($334.6 
ALTIUS PAYMENTS 6602981 
Trans. Date9/1/2004 Trans Seq. #• 89602 Item #• -I Source: Adjustment - PATIENT FINANCE Amt: $7.2t 
Interest 
Trans. Date:l 0/1/2004 Trans. Seq. #: 99069 Item #: -1 Source: Adjustment - PATIENT FINANCE Amt: $0.8^ 
Interest 
Charge Seq. #: 212,619 Primary: Secondary: 
Charge Amount: S 317.57 P. Status: S. Status: Attending Physician: JRR 'Trans. Date: 11/1/200 
Item# From To PQS CPT # Procedure Description Mod ICD 4 , Charges Days or Unit 
Charge Balance: S317.57 
Trans. Date:l 1/1/2005 Trans. Seq. #: 212619 Source: Charges Amt: $317.57 
11/1/2005 11/1/2005 22 COLL ACCOUNT TO COLLECTIONS 0 $317 57 1.0C 
^TVTWmV9TW^mW^FI^ i m i m j J i J • » w • • 
*TS 
peciajiy n<^uual 
Consent and Conditions of Treatment 
Thank you for choosing Cache Valley Speciality Hospital to provide for your hcaJthcarc needs. Wc arc committed to providing exceptional health-
care. The first step in this process is to provide information regarding patient riglits, risks and responsibilities. The second step is to obtain youi 
consenr to Treat the patient. The admitting staff can answer any questions you may have in recordc tr> tH~ #J!rn«i«« « ~ ~ ~ , ~ -
Cache Vulley Specialty Hospital 
J agre. to the folding: S S ™ ™ * . CYOn 
DLOTTEK M.D .JAMES W. DOS Ob/27/QA 
I. CONSENT TO TREAT: I consent to tbe treatment or admission of ss* ooc-oc-OOOO *# cvowaa^i 
at Cache Valley Speciality Hospital for services or supplies that have been or may oc uraerea oy a licensed professional healthcare provider. 
I understand that treatment may include but is not limited to; radiological examinations, laboratory procedures, physical therapy, anesthe-
sia, nursing care or medical and surgical treatment. I understand that all licensed professional healthcare providers that render service to the 
patient arc responsible and liable for their own acts, orders and omissions, 1 acknowledge that the hospital has not made nor can it make a 
guarantee of the outcome of treatment. 
2. FINANCIAL AGREEMENT: I agree to pay for all services and supplies rendered to thc patient in accordance with the rates and financial 
policies in effect at thc time of service. 1 authorize any overpayment made on this account to be transferred to any other account balance for 
which I am responsible. I agree to pay interest fees on any unpaid balance after 60 days of discharge or date of service at a rate not to exceed 
18% apr, If this account is assigned to an attorney or a collection agency for collection then I agree to pay ail collection agency fees, court 
cants, and attorney's fees. 
3. ASSIGNMENT OF INSURANCE BENEFITS; I assign and authorize payment directly to Cache Valley Specialty Hospital of any health-
care benefits that tile patient is entitled to receive. This assignment will not be withdrawn or voided at any time unless I pay the account in 
full. I understand that I am responsible for any and all charges not covered by my insurance policy(s). If thc patient is entitled to Medicare 
or Medicaid benefits under Title XVI11 of thc Social Security Act, I request assignment of benefits directly to Cache Valley Speciality 
Hospital. 
4. ASSIGNMENT OF PHYSICIAN BENEFITS: I am aware that physician services by Radiologist, Pathologist, Anesthesiologist, as well 
as medical, surgical and emergency care arc not billed by the hospital but are billed separately. I understand that 1 am under thc same oblig-
ation to those providers as stated in thb agreement unless otherwise agreed to in writing with those providers. I authorize payment of any 
medical benefits for such claims to the appropriate provider,. 
5. RELEASE OF MEDICAL INFORMATION: I authorize the hospital or any professional healthcare provider who rendered services to 
the patient to release any medical or odier information necessary to process claims. 
6. PERSONAL VALUABLES AND BELONGINGS: I understand that thc hospital maintains a safe for the protection of valuables. I agree 
that the hospital is not responsible for the Joss or damage of any article or personal property unless they are deposited in the safe and a receipt 
issued. 
7. ADVANCE DIRECTIVE/LIVING WILL; Federal Law requires that the hospital provide ail adult patients with information about their 
right to make an Advanced Directive or Living Will. Please mark one of thc following! 
Q The patient has a Living Will or Durable Power of Attorney and requests that a copy be placed in their medical jecord. 
Copy available irom; _ — « _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . 
D The patient requests information in regards to their right to make advance healthcare directives. 
J*K~The patient declines information in regards to their right to make advance healthcare directives. 
Action taken by admission clerk:. 
8. RIGHT TO DONATE ORGANS: The patient understands that they have a right to donate organs and they have discussed their decision 
with their family. Should circumstances arise please do (he following: 
Q Sjj$ak with the family regarding the matter. 
Ek^fnc patient does "NOT wish to donate. Please DO NOT Speak with the family in regards lo thc mailer. 
I understand and accept tbe terms of this agreement and certify that I am duly authorized by thc patient or by law to extcute the above 
agreement in their behalL 
Patient //&MJ*~ (17/7 Date 6 / 1? & / fif Time & V~7 
^ ^ ^ £ / j g Z ^ f<?J%^ —
 ( ( 
Patient's Guardian or Representative Relationship Witness 
EXHIBIT "B }5 
Charles A. Schultz (4760) 
Attorney for James E. Pett 
222 West 700 South 
Brigham City, Utah 84302 
Phone: 435.225.2636 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, LOGAN DEPARTMENT 
SUPERIOR RECOVERY SERVICE, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
JAMES E. PETT, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO STRIKE THEAFFIDA VIT 
OF WENDY GITTINS 
Case No. 060100241 DC 
Judge: Gordon J. Low 
COMES NOW, James Pett and submits the following Memorandum in Support of this 
Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Wendy Gittins (hereinafter "Gittins',). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. In paragraph 3, page 2. of her affidavit Gittins states: "Based upon my personal 
knowledge, memory, and review of the Defendant's account in this matter, I have determined the 
following:" 
2. In paragraph 4, page 2, of her affidavit Gittins states: "On or about May 27, 2004, 
Heather Pett, born September 16, 1999, the defendant's daughter, in Cache County, State of Utah 
obtained services and supplies from Interwest Anesthesia, and the principal charge was $572.00. " 
3. In paragraph 5, page 2, of her affidavit Gittins states: "The Defendant promised to pay 
for these services and supplies, signed a contract (the "Agreement"). 
A. In paragraph 6, page 2, of her affidavit Gittins states: "The Agreement provides that 
among other services that may be provided are anesthesia. " 
5. In paragraph 7, page 2, of her affidavit Gittins states: "The Agreement provides that 
Defendant, in addition to paying for the service and supplies, he is liable for interest at 18% per 
annum, court costs, the costs of collection, which includes a collection fee, and attorney's fees 
incurred in the collection process. " 
6. In paragraph 85 page 2, of her affidavit Gittins states: "The Agreement states under 
paragraph 2: FINANCIAL AGREEMENT: I agree to pay for all services and supplies rendered to 
the patient in accordance with the rates and financial policies in effect at the time of service. " 
7. In paragraph 9, page 2, of her affidavit Gittins states: "Paragraph 3 states: "I 
understand that I am responsible for any and all charges not covered by my insurance policy(s). " 
8. In paragraph 10, page 2, of her affidavit Gittins states: "Per the terms of the Agreement, 
-ii-
and in order to make sure that Interwest Anesthesia is made whole, a collection charge was added 
to the account in the amount of $317.57prior to referral to Superior. " 
9. In paragraph 11, page 2, of her affidavit Gittins states: "The Defendant breached the 
Agreement by not paying for the services and supphes. " 
10. In paragraph 12, page 2, of her affidavit Gittins states: "On or about July 12, 2004 the 
Defendant's insurance company Altius, sent a payment, in the amount of $334.62, to Interwest 
Anesthesia. " 
11. In paragraph 13, page 2, of her affidavit Gittins states: "However, Altius retracted that 
payment on July 31, 2005, because on or about February 25, 2005, Altius paid the Defendant 
$514.80, to pay for the services and supplies provided by Interwest Anesthesia to the Defendant's 
daughter on or about May 27, 2004. " 
12. In paragraph 14, page 2, of her affidavit Gittins states: "We sent statements to the 
Defendant on a regular basis. On the account statement, when there is a finance charge, those 
dates that we sent statements. Finally, on September 2005, Interwest Anesthesia sent a pre-
collection letter to the defendant, which included a copy of the account statement to day, 
requesting payment. " 
-in-
ARGUMENT 
BECAUSE GITTINS9 AFFIDAVIT DOES NOT COMPLY WITH THE EXPRESS 
PROVISIONS OF RULE 56(e) URCP, IT MUST BE STRICKEN. 
In pertinent part, Rule 56(e) URCP, (hereinafter "Rule 56"), provides as follows: 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing 
affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would 
be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent 
to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or 
parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith 
The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits. (Emphasis added). 
Gittins' affidavit is not based on personal knowledge, as required by Rule 56. Therefore, it must 
be stricken. 
In paragraph 3, page 2, of her affidavit Gittins states: "Based upon my personal knowledge, 
memory, and review of the Defendant's account in this matter... " Gittins5 memory and review of 
the Defendant's account is not personal knowledge as mandated by Rule 56. Gittins' "review of 
the Defendant's account in this matter" does not qualify as personal knowledge. While Mr. Pett's 
account, so long as it contains only documents prepared and kept in the ordinary course of 
business may be admissible, does not mean that Mr. Pett's account is within Gittins' personal 
knowledge, and Gittins cannot base her affidavit on her personal interpretation of the alleged 
contents of Mr. Pett's account. Therefore, any portion of her affidavit that is based on her alleged 
(t
 review of the Defendant's account in this matter... " is improper testimony in an affidavit and 
must be stricken. 
-1 -
Likewise, any of Gittins5 statements in her Affidavit based on her alleged "review of the 
Defendant 's account in this matter... " must be stricken because her affidavit does not contain 
"Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit " as mandated 
by Rule 56. Therefore, any portion of her affidavit that is based on her alleged "review of the 
Defendant's account in this matter... " is improper testimony in an affidavit and must be stricken. 
All of Gittins' affidavit after paragraph 3 must be stricken because all of those subsequent 
paragraphs are her personal conclusions, and affidavits must be based on personal knowledge of 
facts not conclusions. As previously set forth in this Memorandum, in paragraph 3, page 2, of her 
affidavit Gittins states: "Based upon my personal knowledge, memory, and review of the 
Defendant's account in this matter, I have determined the following:" 
Gittins is unequivocally stating that everything in her affidavit after paragraph 3 is 
something that she has personally determined, not that she knows, not even something that she 
believes she may remember, but something that she has determined. Rule 56 does not permit 
affidavits to be based on a person's opinion, conclusions or determinations. Because Gittins 
unequivocally states that everything in her affidavit after paragraph 3 is something that she has 
determined, paragraphs 5 through 14 of her affidavit must be stricken. 
CONCLUSION 
Because Gittins affidavit is not based on personal knowledge, as required by Rule 56, it 
must be stricken. Because paragraphs 4 through 14 or her affidavit are, by her own admission, her 
-2-
personal determination, rather than statements of fact based on her personal knowledge, 
paragraphs 4 through 14 or her affidavit must be stricken as a matter of law. Therefore, the Court 
must grant Mr. Pett's Motion to Strike and strike paragraphs 4 through 14 or Gittins' affidavit. 
Respectfully submitted this day of August 2006. 
- / 
Charles A. Schultz 
Attorney for James E. Pett 
